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Article

When Database Queries Are Fourth
Amendment Searches
Emily Berman †
INTRODUCTION
As anyone familiar with Law & Order knows, the Fourth
Amendment demands that—before conducting a search or seizure—the government must secure a warrant. To be valid, the
warrant must (1) be approved by a neutral decision-maker; (2)
be based on a showing of probable cause; and (3) describe with
particularity the places to be searched or the things to be
seized.1
Outside the world of police procedurals, however, the legal
framework regulating the government’s investigative powers
permits the collection of a great deal of information without
abiding by prior approval, individualized cause, 2 or particularity requirements. Specifically, investigators need not meet traditional warrant requirements in at least two types of situations—warrant requirement exceptions and what I call “Fourth
Amendment exemptions.” 3 When an exception to the warrant
requirement applies, the government satisfies Fourth Amendment demands merely by demonstrating that its actions are
† Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.
Thanks go to Seth Chandler, Dave Fagundes, Barry Friedman, Aziz Huq, David Kwok, James Nelson, D. Theodore Rave, Jessica Roberts, Joe Sanders, and
Greg Vetter, as well as participants in the 2016 Texas Legal Scholars workshop, the 2017 AALS National Security Law Section’s New Voices Panel, and
the 2017 Michigan Young Scholars Conference, particularly Peter Margulies,
Dakota Rudesill, and Margo Schlanger. All errors are the author ’s. Copyright
© 2017 by Emily Berman.
1. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
2. An “individualized suspicion” requirement demands that the government show cause—usually probable cause or reasonable suspicion—to believe
that a search of a particular individual is justified. United States v. Chandler,
520 U.S. 305, 305–06 (1997).
3. See infra Part II.A.1.
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reasonable.4 In Fourth Amendment exemptions, the government’s collection activity does not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore the Fourth Amendment does not
regulate the collection at all.5 Such investigative activity is
considered neither a search nor a seizure, and is thus exempt
from constitutional limitations. Together, warrant requirement
exceptions and Fourth Amendment exemptions permit the government to lawfully scoop up an enormous volume of information about Americans, often without any reason to suspect
any particular American of wrongdoing and with no demonstrated connection to crime or specific intelligence needs.
Moreover, there are no constitutional restrictions at all on
how the government uses this vast expanse of data. So long as
its collection is lawful, the Fourth Amendment has nothing to
say about how information is employed.6 Rather, current constitutional doctrine allows the government to combine, compile,
and analyze any information in its possession—even as the
volume of this information becomes ever larger and analytical
tools ever more powerful.
Courts and commentators recognize that the government’s
broad collection authority raises significant privacy concerns.
The conventional response is to suggest expanding the scope of
collection regulation, either by narrowing warrant requirement
exceptions 7 or broadening the definition of what qualifies as a
search or seizure. 8 Thus existing doctrine and extant reform
4. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126–27 (2000) (discussing
the court’s analysis of reasonable suspicion).
5. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The reasonableexpectation-of-privacy inquiry asks first whether the government has violated
an expectation of privacy, and second, whether society is prepared to accept
that expectation as reasonable. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also infra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. E.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION (2017) (discussing policing reform in the United States).
8. The most common suggestion is to eliminate or constrain the thirdparty doctrine, which exempts from Fourth Amendment protections any information voluntarily conveyed to a third party. See, e.g., Erin Murphy, The
Case Against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response to Epstein and
Kerr, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1252–53 (2009) (arguing that the thirdparty doctrine’s application should vary based on the voluntariness with which
the records were shared); Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy: Fourth
Amendment “Papers” and the Third-Party Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y
247, 249–50 (2015) (arguing that the government should be required to obtain
a warrant prior to seizing some third-party data); Daniel J. Solove, Digital
Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
1083, 1157 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Digital Dossiers] (arguing that the
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proposals both accept as given that the Fourth Amendment’s
scope is limited to regulation of information collection. The privacy impact of large amounts of data, however, does not come
solely from the sweeping nature of the government’s collection
authority. The government’s postcollection use of information
can—and often does—implicate privacy interests just as strongly.
This Article focuses on one form of information use with
particularly troubling effects on privacy: database queries that
implicate the aggregation problem. 9 The aggregation problem,
a label coined by Professor Daniel Solove, refers to the fact that
the government can collect enough data—both in the sense of
volume and of variety—that its aggregation and analysis can
actually change the nature of the information, providing revelations that could not have been gleaned from the isolated bits
of information alone. 10 At a certain point, the whole equals
more than the sum of its parts. Yet because such aggregation
necessarily takes place only after the information is collected,
the extraction of such revelations is not subject to any constitutional restrictions. I contend that when database queries about
particular U.S. persons have the capacity to aggregate data
such that it will reveal information that, in the absence of aggregation, the government could only access by conducting a
search or seizure, the extraction of that information should be
subject to constitutionally based limits. 11 In other words, when
third-party doctrine should apply only to “systems of records”); see also Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 31 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and remanded,
800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (arguing that the third-party doctrine does not
apply to bulk collection of telephony metadata). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Case
for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561 (2009) (defending the
third-party doctrine).
9. Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 8, at 1154.
10. Id.; Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477,
514 (2006) [hereinafter Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy] (“Aggregation creates
. . . a ‘digital person,’ a portrait composed of information fragments combined
together.”); see also Joseph S. Fulda, Data Mining and Privacy, 11 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 105, 110 (2000) (noting that “two (conventional) data about an
individual, each innocuous in itself ” can together “produce new (conventional)
knowledge about the individual”).
11. Database queries about particular U.S. persons are distinct from what
is commonly labeled data mining. See infra notes 157–58 and accompanying
text. This Article’s analysis is limited to U.S. person queries and leaves discussion of Fourth Amendment limits on data mining to future work. Indeed,
there is already a vibrant and quickly growing literature regarding the constitutional implications of data mining. E.g., Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH.
L. REV. 461 (2015) (discussing trends in policing technique); Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L.
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a database query returns information that the government
could otherwise collect only through a Fourth Amendment–
regulated means, the Fourth Amendment should regulate that
query. If the government accesses an American’s electronic
communications, for example, the same expectation of privacy
is violated—the expectation that the government does not have
access to our private communications in the absence of a court
order 12—regardless of whether the government collected those
communications directly, pursuant to a warrant, or accessed
them by querying a database in which communications collected incidentally to the targeting of a non-American are stored.13
Note that the Constitution is triggered here by the nature of
the information exposed by the query, not the nature of the information that makes up the underlying database(s). 14
The Fourth Amendment should regulate information use
as well as its collection, I argue, because no modification to the
collection rules will address threats to privacy that come solely
from information use.15 The digital age has rendered collectionfocused efforts alone an insufficient means of preserving individual privacy, particularly in light of the fact that the government (1) is able to extract more information from the same data
REV. 327, 329–30 (2015) (discussing current trends toward “big data” and
away from “small data”); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and
Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259, 265 (2012) (analyzing possible effect of data analysis on policing); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big
Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35 (2014); Erin Murphy,
Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 803, 812 (2010) (discussing the impact of databases on law enforcement).
12. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (so holding in the intelligence context); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (so
holding in the criminal context).
13. The reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test itself is generally recognized to be unpredictable and largely circular. See infra notes 159–61 and accompanying text. But so long as Katz governs the question of what qualifies as
a search, that is the relevant standard. Moreover, to the extent that queries
expose knowledge, the collection of which is already definitively recognized as
a search, the indeterminate nature of the Katz inquiry itself does not pose a
problem.
14. Recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in a database search
is concededly a significant expansion of Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test, which to date has applied only to information collection. This expansion, however, is no more significant than the expansion of Fourth Amendment coverage that Katz itself represented at the time. See infra notes 187–93
and accompanying text.
15. This is not to say that collection reforms are not also important. I
agree, for example, that the third-party doctrine should be curtailed. The point
here is simply that if the concern comes from how the government is using information, reforming collection rules cannot alleviate that concern entirely.
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than it used to;16 and (2) that the costs of storage and analysis
have plummeted.17
Of course, the Constitution is not the only source of legal
restrictions on government activity. Statutory, regulatory, policy-based, or judicially imposed constraints apply to use at
times. Exactly what rules govern the collection and use of particular types of information vary, depending on both the nature
of the data and the nature of the collection. When it comes to
data regarding electronic communications, for example, noncontent data (or metadata)—like call records or email routing
information—currently lacks constitutional protection. 18 But
that data is subject to statutory constraints on its collection. 19
The same is true for data such as financial and medical records.
Even information that normally enjoys full Fourth Amendment
protection under the warrant requirement, such as electronic
communications, can sometimes be subject to a different regime. Thus when collecting electronic communications by targeting non-U.S. persons outside the United States for foreign
intelligence purposes, which will inevitably collect the communications of U.S. persons as well—that collection need only be
reasonable to satisfy the Constitution, 20 while more specific
regulation comes from other sources. 21 A patchwork of limits
from disparate sources regulates the vast sea of data unrelated
16. Blood collected at a crime scene, for example, historically could only
allow law enforcement to determine its type. Now that same sample can provide a detailed genetic profile. Sophisticated analysis of large volumes of data
has similarly magnified the volume of knowledge that can be extracted from
information. See Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the
Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (2008) (discussing the expansion of
the government’s ability to analyze data about American citizens).
17. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (noting that technological advances enable greater police surveillance).
18. See In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production
of Tangible Things from [REDACTED] 9 (FISA Ct., Aug. 29, 2013) (holding
that collection of bulk telephony metadata is not regulated by the Fourth
Amendment).
19. See 50 U.S.C. § 1842(h)(1) (2012) (instructing the Attorney General to
develop “appropriate policies and procedures” for protecting the privacy of
“nonpublicly available information concerning United States persons”); USA
FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, §§ 201–202, 129 Stat. 268 (2015)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861) (prohibiting bulk collection and instituting privacy procedures).
20. In re Directives [REDACTED] Pursuant to Section 105b of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
21. See infra notes 107–11 and accompanying text (discussing the nonconstitutional limits on government use of Americans’ electronic communications
captured in the courts of foreign intelligence surveillance).

582

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:577

to communications—social media postings; digital records of an
individual’s movements; and public records such as arrests, real estate purchases, or professional licenses.
Some commentators argue that these unconstitutional
rules are the appropriate means to regulate the government’s
use of information.22 I disagree for a number of reasons.23 First,
if limits on information collection are any guide, nonconstitutional restrictions are often significantly less protective than
Fourth Amendment–based regulation, frequently requiring only that the information is relevant to an ongoing investigation.24 Second, Congress has been an unreliable actor in this
area, legislating piecemeal—often in response to some form of
scandal—rather than developing a comprehensive information
privacy regime. 25 Similarly, internal or executive branch policy
constraints generate a hodgepodge of rules, with different regulations applicable to different agencies, any of which may be
modified at any time and are frequently secret. These are not
qualities that generate sustained, meaningful privacy protections. Finally, the government is now capable of uncovering
many of our most intimate details—things that historically
might have been discoverable only by searching someone’s “papers” 26—simply by manipulating data. Fourth Amendment doctrine must evolve to recognize some database queries as
searches just as it has evolved over time in other ways to ad-

22. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Use Restrictions and the Future of Surveillance
Law, in THE FUTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION 3 (2011) (advocating for regulation of the entire surveillance process); William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles and Haystacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1637
(2010) (arguing for the development of a standardized system for authorized
use of collected information); Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 10, at
521–22 (describing a framework through which to understand privacy). But
see, Ric Simmons, The Mirage of Use Restrictions, 96 N.C.L. REV. (forthcoming
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2937809 (reviewing use restrictions and discussing their justifications).
23. See infra Part III.C (discussing the need for constitutional regulation).
24. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75 MISS. L.J. 139, 149–67 (2005) (detailing the ease with which the
government may collect call detail records, public records, medical records,
credit information, stored communications, tangible things, and more); see also
infra notes 251–52.
25. See infra notes 253–61 and accompanying text (discussing the insufficiency of legislative action).
26. The Fourth Amendment protects from unreasonable searches and seizures of people’s “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. CONST. amend.
IV.
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dress challenges posed by new technology and new investigative techniques. 27
While my proposal would significantly expand the Fourth
Amendment and may sound drastic, it is not as stark a divergence from existing doctrine as it may first appear. Indeed, my
doctrinal approach builds on two existing strands of Fourth
Amendment law. The first is a series of what I call collectionplus situations—circumstances in which collection is constitutionally permissible only when paired with postcollection use
restrictions.28 The Supreme Court has determined, for example,
that foreign intelligence surveillance is consistent with the
Fourth Amendment only when exercised in concert with “minimization procedures”—rules governing the government’s retention and dissemination of the fruits of that surveillance. 29
Imposing constitutional constraints on information use alone—
as opposed to imposing them in conjunction with limits on particularly intrusive collection techniques—merely takes an additional step down that path.
The other strand of Fourth Amendment law on which I
draw comes from the Supreme Court’s recent efforts to grapple
with the powerful effects of information aggregation. United
States v. Jones examined the scope of the government’s authority to engage in long-term warrantless GPS tracking. Black letter Fourth Amendment law provides that information identifying one’s location in a public space at any given moment is
exempt from Fourth Amendment protection.30 In Jones, however, the Court faced the question whether aggregating information about an individual’s precise location over the course of
several weeks should lie similarly beyond the Constitution’s
reach. In concurring opinions, five justices agreed that because
such a “precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public
movements” exposes “a wealth of detail about [that person’s]
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,” it violates a reasonable expectation of privacy and
should therefore be considered a search. 31 In other words, the
27. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the
Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011) (discussing how courts adjust Fourth Amendment doctrine in response to technology).
28. See infra notes 204–17 and accompanying text.
29. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972);
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58 (1967).
30. See infra notes 93–96 and accompanying text.
31. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492 (2014) (rejecting
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aggregation of many pieces of data was simply too intrusive to
go unregulated, even though the collection of any one piece of
that data—the defendant’s location at any given moment—
remained untouched by Fourth Amendment limits. When database queries about U.S. persons similarly reveal intimate
knowledge discoverable only by aggregating multiple pieces of
data, courts should consider those queries Fourth Amendment
searches, regardless of how the data were collected.
Any objections to my proposal based on logistical concerns
fail as well. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
has already provided a model for implementing these doctrinal
changes in its own jurisprudence. 32 As I have argued elsewhere, the FISC imposed constraints in the form of minimization procedures on the government’s Section 215 bulk telephony metadata program that approximated each of the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement’s elements. 33 And while the
FISC did not explicitly rest these restrictions on constitutional
foundations, its means of imposing ex ante review, as well as
cause and particularity requirements, nevertheless provides a
blueprint for what a Fourth Amendment use-restriction regime
might look like.
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I will first illustrate the incredible breadth and volume of information the
government may collect. It will then demonstrate the threat to
privacy that the power to aggregate that data poses. Part II
turns to Fourth Amendment doctrine, first explaining how warrant requirement exceptions and Fourth Amendment exemptions remove much information collection from constraints traditionally applicable to searches and seizures and then
exploring the powerful investigative tool this collection represents in light of the absence of use restrictions. In Part III, I
will begin by making the case for treating as searches some database queries about U.S. persons. I will then show how the
FISC’s jurisprudence provides a model for how this doctrinal
shift might be implemented. Finally, I will explain why we
the warrantless search of an arrestee’s cell phone given the nature of the revelations made possible by searching smartphone contents); see also Jones, 565
U.S. at 419–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
32. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) is a federal court
created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1801–1885(c) (2012) to review government applications to engage in domestic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. Id. § 1803(d).
33. Emily Berman, Quasi-Constitutional Protections and Government
Surveillance, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 771 (2016).
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need constitutionally based use restrictions, rather than relying on statutory or regulatory rules. The Article will then briefly conclude.
I. COLLECTION AND AGGREGATION OF INFORMATION
This Part surveys the types of information the government
collects about Americans and demonstrates that when the volume and variety of this information is combined with the government’s analytical capacity “it is possible to learn far more
than most people had anticipated.” 34
A. THE INFORMATION THE GOVERNMENT CAN COLLECT 35
Most information the government collects does not implicate the Fourth Amendment at all. Information regarding immigration, social security benefits, military service, census information, and income tax is collected and stored in the course
of everyday operations. Other sources of information are government audits, agency oversight activities, personnel hiring,
and more. Many of these records will include information such
as an individual’s physical description, family history (marriages, divorces, children), place of residence, political activity, financial information, health care records (including medical
conditions and use of prescription drugs), social security number, and beyond.36 Statutes and regulations—rather than constitutional law—control government access to this type of information.
Of course, intelligence and law enforcement operations also
engage in their own major collection operations. We learned
with great fanfare in 2013 from the Edward Snowden leaks
that the National Security Agency (NSA) had been collecting
since 2006, bulk telephony metadata records—comprised of in34. John P. Holdren & Eric S. Lander, Letter to President Barack Obama,
in BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (2014). One hint
at the volume of information involved comes from the NSA’s recent construction of a data storage facility roughly five times larger than the U.S. Capitol.
James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center (Watch
What You Say), WIRED (Mar. 15, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/03/ff_
nsadatacenter.
35. As this path has been well-trodden by others, this discussion will provide a broad overview. For more detailed discussion about government information collection, I commend to you the sources cited in notes 36–52, infra.
36. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy
and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2002) [hereinafter Solove,
Access and Aggregation].
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formation such the length of a call, the phone number from
which the call was made, and the phone number dialed—
produced by each telephone company regarding “all telephone
calls made through its systems or using its services where one
or both ends of the call are located in the United States.” 37 The
revelation that, going back as far as 1987, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) had “routine access” to similar information regarding “every call that passes through an AT&T
switch—not just those made by AT&T customers”—drew less
attention.38 Call detail records are available to the government
if they are “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 39 Law enforcement entities regularly seek other information from communications providers as well, notably cell
site location information. 40 The Supreme Court granted certio37. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 796 (2d Cir. 2015). “Metadata can also reveal the user or device making or receiving a call through unique ‘identity
numbers,’” as well as the routing of a call, which can indicate a caller ’s general
location. Id. at 793–94; see also ADMIN. WHITE PAPER, BULK COLLECTION OF
TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 3
(2013) (explaining the government’s legal basis for an intelligence collection
program). Defining the line between content and metadata in the context of
electronic communications has proved less than straightforward. See, e.g.,
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that e-mails
constitute communications content protected by the Fourth Amendment);
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that Internet
Protocol addresses are noncontent metadata).
38. Scott Shane & Colin Moynihan, Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove,
Eclipsing N.S.A.’s, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
09/02/us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
40. Cell site location information (CSLI) is the compilation of data that
cellular phones communicate with cell towers, conveying to cellular service
providers details regarding the tower locations relied upon by users. According
to AT&T, that company received 64,703 requests for such information in 2014;
in the first half of 2015, Verizon received more than 21,000 such requests.
Robinson Meyer, Do Police Need a Warrant To See Where a Phone Is?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/08/
warrantless-cell-phone-location-tracking/400775. For readers familiar with the
podcast Serial, you may recall that much of the government’s case against
Adnan Syed for the 1999 murder of Hae Min Lee came from CSLI, and much
of the uncertainty regarding his guilt or innocence comes from debate regarding the accuracy and reliability of such records. See Season One, SERIAL,
https://serialpodcast.org/season-one (last visited Nov. 5, 2017). For readers unfamiliar with Serial, do yourself a favor and listen to season one as soon as
possible. Several circuits have determined that acquiring an individual’s historical CSLI is not a search and therefore does not require a warrant. See, e.g.,
United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc); United
States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Davis, 785
F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015).
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rari this Term to decide whether the warrantless collection of
this kind of location information enjoys Fourth Amendment
protection. 41
Police forces and the FBI have an insatiable desire for data, and deploy a variety of sophisticated information collection
tools to acquire it: cell tower simulators, 42 automatic licenseplate-recognition cameras—a technology designed to mark the
location of a particular vehicle at a particular time 43—and a
variety of surveillance cameras mounted on aerial drones,44 in
fixed locations, and on police cars and police officers. 45 Sophisticated means of conducting covert audio, video, and tracking
surveillance are marketed to cities flush with counterterrorism
funding. 46 The New York Police Department (NYPD) has
41. Carpenter v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017).
42. See, e.g., Nicky Woolf, Stingray Documents Offer Rare Insight into Police and FBI Surveillance, GUARDIAN (Aug. 26, 2016), http://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2016/aug/26/stingray-oakland-police-fbi-surveillance (discussing
the FBI’s use of cell site simulators).
43. See Cyrus Farivar, Your Car, Tracked: The Rapid Rise of License Plate
Readers, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 27, 2012), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2012/09/your-car-tracked-the-rapid-rise-of-license-plate-readers; Richard
Read, DEA Is Spying on Millions of U.S. Drivers with License Plate Readers,
WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/cars/dea-is
-spying-on-millions-of-us-drivers-with-license-plate-readers/2015/01/27/
96cb42c6-a644-11e4-a162-121d06ca77f1_story.html. The International Association of Chiefs of Police pointed out that automated license plate readers “may
collect the license plate numbers of vehicles parked at locations that, even
though public, might be considered sensitive, such as doctor ’s offices, clinics,
churches, and addiction counseling meetings, among others.” INT’L ASS’N OF
CHIEFS OF POLICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT REP. FOR THE UTILIZATION
OF LICENSE PLATE READERS 21 (2009).
44. See Jack Gillum, et al., FBI Behind Mysterious Surveillance Aircraft
Over U.S. Cities, PBS (June 2, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/
fbi-behind-mysterious-surveillance-aircraft-u-s-cities.
45. See, e.g., William M. Bulkeley, Chicago’s Camera Network Is Everywhere, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 17, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748704538404574539910412824756 (noting Chicago’s police
department links its 1500 cameras with thousands of other cameras deployed
by other government agencies and the private sector); Mike Carter, Judge
Blocks Seattle from Revealing Locations of FBI’s Hidden Cameras on Utility
Poles, SEATTLE TIMES (June 13, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle
-news/crime/judge-blocks-seattle-city-light-from-disclosing-locations-of-fbi
-surveillance-cameras.
46. The tactical communications and surveillance catalog of British defense contractor Cobham was recently made public. It describes covert audio,
video, and tracking surveillance equipment available to law enforcement
agencies. Product Quick Guide, COBHAM TACTICAL COMMC’NS & SURVEILLANCE (Feb. 2014), https://www.cobham.com/media/1078613/Cobham_TCS_
QuickGuide_Mar14.pdf.
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worked with Microsoft to develop what it calls domain awareness system (DAS), which aggregates in real time various data
from the city’s public surveillance cameras, arrest records, lists
of completed crimes and their characteristics, vehicle tracking
information collected from license plate readers, and more.47
Moreover, agencies, at all levels of government, that collect data frequently share it both within the agency and externally to
other government entities, 48 though the terms of the use of that
data often remain shrouded from public view. 49
The government also acquires a great deal of information
from the private sector. Some private-sector information comes
from data-collection firms, such as ChoicePoint and Acxiom,
that compile data from public records from around the country—information about births, marriages, divorces, property
transactions, professional licenses, arrests, court proceedings,
and more—and combine it with information from other sources,
such as private detectives, as well as social media websites,
property records, public health data, car rentals, utility bills,
insurance claims, postal records, purchase history from discount and member-loyalty cards, and credit reporting firms, for
sale to potential employers, landlords, and governments.50 A
47. Joh, supra note 11, at 48–49; Press Release, Office of the Mayor,
Mayor Bloomberg, Police Commissioner Kelly and Microsoft Unveil New,
State-of-the-Art Law Enforcement Technology That Aggregates and Analyzes
Existing Public Safety Data in Real Time To Provide a Comprehensive View of
Potential Threats and Criminal Activity (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www1.nyc
.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/291-12/mayor-bloomberg-police-commissioner
-kelly-microsoft-new-state-of-the-art-law. As of 2013, the NYPD had a database of sixteen million license plates, along with the data regarding where
they were captured. Id. Microsoft is also marketing this technology to other
cities; New York City will receive thirty percent of the proceeds from future
sales. Id.
48. See, e.g., RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
WHAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES WITH AMERICANS’ DATA 19–47 (2013), https://
www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Data%20Retention%20
-%20FINAL.pdf.
49. See, e.g., Larry Greenemeier, What Is the Big Secret Surrounding
Stingray Surveillance?, SCI. AMERICAN (June 25, 2015), https://www
.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-the-big-secret-surrounding-stingray
-surveillance.
50. David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98
MINN. L. REV. 62, 142 (2013); Slobogin, supra note 16, at 320; Solove, Digital
Dossiers, supra note 8, at 1151 (discussing government contracts with such
private firms). This flow of information from the private sector grows ever
larger as the government encourages the development of “new informationgathering technologies.” See Id. at 1100. Information is big business. See Murphy, supra note 11 at 805–10 (2010) (discussing the history and current capacity of information databases); Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 8, at 1092
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relatively new source of private-sector information is the Internet of Things—devices connected to the Internet that send and
receive information—which allows the makers of products to
track and record how they are used. Everything from thermostats to coffeemakers to baby monitors can be connected to the
Internet, and information about those devices’ use can be captured in databases, 51 the contents of which the government can
then acquire.52
Together, the information the government collects through
routine activity, intelligence operations, law enforcement tools,
and deals with private-sector data brokers a bewildering
amount of information with little, if any, particularized basis.53
To be sure, some of this data collection is valuable—necessary
even. Imagine trying to redraw congressional districts without
the census, or collecting taxes without information about individuals’ incomes. But this nonexhaustive list of the government’s contemporary data-collection potential should convey
the enormity of both its volume and its breadth.
(“From credit reporting agencies, the government can glean information relating to financial transactions, debts, creditors, and checking accounts [as well
as] details about people’s race, income, opinions, political beliefs, health, lifestyle, and purchasing habits from database companies.”); id. at 1084 (“In the
Information Age, an increasing amount of personal information is contained in
records maintained by Internet Service Providers (ISPs), phone companies,
cable companies, merchants, bookstores, websites, hotels, landlords, employers
and private sector entities.”). For evidence that information truly is big business, note that at one point ChoicePoint was valued at $3.6 billion. Reed Elsevier To Acquire ChoicePoint for $3.6 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/technology/21iht-reed.4.10279549.html.
51. Bernard Marr, Google’s Nest: Big Data and the Internet of Things in
the Connected Home, FORBES (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bernardmarr/2015/08/05/googles-nest-big-data-and-the-internet-of-things-in
-the-connected-home/#6eb45273bac4.
52. See Trevor Timm, The Government Just Admitted It Will Use Smart
Home Devices for Spying, GUARDIAN (Feb 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian
.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/09/internet-of-things-smart-devices-spying
-surveillance-us-government. The same holds true for anything that conveys
information about your movements and your purchases, such as items that
contain a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag, which can include your
passport, your credit card, your supermarket loyalty card, even the clothes
that you wear. See Miguel Bustillo, Wal-Mart Radio Tags To Track Clothing,
WALL ST. J., July 23, 2010, at A1; Alejandro Martınez-Cabrera, Concern over
Privacy As ID Tags’ Use Expands, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 6, 2010, at D1 (reporting
that a California county implanted RFID tags in preschoolers’ uniforms).
53. See Joh, supra note 11, at 39 (noting that ninety percent of the world’s
data has been generated in the past two years, and that we now create as
much information in two days as we did from the beginning of human civilization until 2003).
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B. THE AGGREGATION PROBLEM
Though the volume and variety of information to which the
government has access raises its own questions, my primary
concern is what the combination (aggregation) of so much information enables the government to discover. Analysis can derive from data that private information, “at the time of their
collection, seemed to raise no, or only manageable, privacy issues.” 54 Professor Solove has called this phenomenon the aggregation problem. 55 When seen “in isolation, each piece of our
day-to-day information is not all that telling; viewed in combination, it begins to paint a portrait about” us. 56 The upshot is
54. PRES.’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., BIG DATA AND PRIVAA TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE at ix (2014), https://obamawhitehouse
.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_data_and_
privacy_-_may_2014.pdf [hereinafter PCAST].
55. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 36, at 1185; see also Jack
M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 12 (2008) (noting that technologies allow the government “to record
perfectly innocent behavior that no one is particularly ashamed of and draw
from that data surprisingly powerful inferences about people’s behavior, beliefs, and attitudes”); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework To Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L.
Rev. 93, 106 (2014) (“[O]ne cannot assess the predictive privacy risks from the
collection of a single data point.”); Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v.
Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 773, 826 (2015) (discussing how
a fusion of locational-body surveillance and biographical-behavioral surveillance allows the government to enable tracking and data analytics on potential suspects and/or terrorists); Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 8, at 1154
(“A fact here or there may seem innocuous but when combined, they become
more telling about that person.”).
The aggregation problem is related to, but is distinct from, what has been
labeled mosaic theory, which posits that “a series of acts that are not searches
in isolation amount to a search when considered as a group.” See Orin S. Kerr,
The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 320
(2012). The idea is that multiple nonsearches combined together may amount
to a search because of the mosaic they reveal. Id. The quintessential example
is the long-term surveillance of an individual’s public movements—combining
a sufficient number of location data points over a sufficient period of time will
reveal a great deal of information about the surveillance target’s life. While
the mosaic theory describes one form of aggregation—the aggregation of information resulting from a series of government collection activities—it is focused on determining when a sequence of government acts constitutes a
search. By contrast, I do not argue that a series of nonsearches becomes a
search when a certain threshold is crossed. Instead, I argue that the single act
of querying a database can itself be a search. See infra notes 221–24 and accompanying text.
56. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 36, at 1185; see also
PCAST, supra note 54, at x (noting that aggregating data “can result in the
identification of individual people, the creation of profiles of an individual, and
the tracking of an individual’s activities”).
CY:
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that when government officials search—or query—aggregated
information, they can learn a great deal more about the subject
of the query than they could have done using any individual
piece of data alone. Importantly, the additional information data aggregation provides may be “precisely the same information
[the government] previously would have been required to obtain a warrant to access,” thereby undermining existing privacy
protections.57
Think of the aggregation problem as the difference between
explicit and implicit knowledge. 58 Explicit knowledge is information that is plain on the face of data. Implicit knowledge is
information that can be extracted through data analysis. 59
Consider the following hypothetical. Jane’s neighbor (or the license plate reader in her neighborhood) knows that, beginning
two months ago, she started leaving for work one hour earlier
on Thursday mornings than on other workdays; the grocery
store clerk (or the grocery store’s member-loyalty program)
knows that over that same time frame, Jane has eaten a pint of
coffee ice cream every week; and the barista at a coffee shop on
the other side of town (or the coffee shop’s frequent-customer
program) knows that she recently became a Thursday morning
regular.
Standing alone, each of these disclosures reveals only a
small amount of information about Jane, none of which is particularly sensitive. But imagine that each of these facts was
digitally stored in a government database, which investigators
57. TECH. & PRIVACY ADVISORY COMM.,
GUARDING PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST

U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, SAFETERRORISM 36 (2004), https://
www.cdt.org/files/security/usapatriot/20040300tapac.pdf.
58. K.A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots
To Make Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3, 37 (2003).
Extracting implicit information means that the results of data mining
are not existing data items in the database. Traditional information
retrieval from a database returns arrays consisting of data from individual fields of records (or entire records) from the database in response to a defined or specified database query. The results of the
traditional database query are explicit in the database, that is, the
answer returned to a query is itself a data item (or an array of many
items) in the database. Data mining techniques, however, extract
knowledge from the database that is implicit—knowledge that typically does not exist a priori is revealed.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
59. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (noting that momentary location information is not particularly
revealing, but aggregating location information can generate “a precise, comprehensive record” of a person’s life, reflecting “a wealth of detail about her
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations”).
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can then query for all of the information it contains about Jane.
The results of that query could easily lead to the conclusion
(whether correct or incorrect) that something in Jane’s life
changed two months ago and that she now has a weekly
Thursday morning appointment somewhere near a particular
coffee shop. Further investigation into this Thursday morning
activity could reveal regular trips to a psychiatrist, a fertility
clinic, a substance abuse rehabilitation center, or any number
of other intensely personal activities that neither a neighbor
nor a barista could divine with the isolated bits of information
available to them. In other words, querying a database compiled from disparate sources “reveals facts about data subjects
in ways far beyond anything they expected” based on what they
have revealed publicly. 60 The whole is more than the sum of its
parts.
The threat posed by aggregation is not limited to hypotheticals. The NSA’s post-9/11 surveillance programs illustrate the
aggregation problem’s implications. The now-discontinued Section 215 bulk telephone metadata surveillance program (named
after the relevant statutory provision of the USA PATRIOT
Act) 61 involved collecting and aggregating all of Americans’ telephony metadata, thereby compiling an enormous volume of
Americans’ telephone communications records.62 Government
analysts could then query that database using a seed identifier,
basically a search term (here, usually a phone number), to extract information regarding a particular individual.63 A query
yields “phone numbers, and the metadata associated with
60. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 10, at 508; Solove, Access
and Aggregation, supra note 36, at 1178 (“We know that our lives will remain
private not in the sense that the information will be completely shielded from
public access, but . . . because it is a needle in a haystack, and usually nobody
will take the time to try to find it.”).
61. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272,
277–78 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)) (permitting
the FBI to “make an application for an order requiring the production of any
tangible things . . . for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information . . . or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities”). The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 eliminated the use of Section 215 for bulk collection. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23,
129 Stat. 268 (2015) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861).
62. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 8 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-report_on_the_
telephone_records_program.pdf [hereinafter PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT].
63. Id. at 26–31.
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them, that have been in contact with the seed.” 64 At that point,
the government can then search for the numbers and associated metadata that have been in contact with the numbers the
first query returns. 65 So rather than simply getting the list of
numbers with which the seed is in contact, the aggregation of
all metadata allows the government to map the entire communications network of the seed number. 66 Even conceding for the
sake of argument that the collection of a single, targeted individual’s phone records does not raise privacy concerns,67 the
capabilities exercised in the Section 215 metadata program
might give us pause. Indeed, it gave the American public pause
when it came to light. 68
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) Amendments Act provides an even more troubling illustration, as that program authorizes the government to collect
communications content, 69 which the Constitution has always
treated as one of the most intrusive forms of surveillance. 70 The
program collects the electronic communications into and out of
the United States of a target “reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States.” 71 Electronic communications in64. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 797 (2d Cir. 2015).
65. Id.; PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 62, at 29 (“[Investigators
are] able to view the records of calls involving telephone numbers that had
contact with a telephone number that had contact with the original target.”).
66. Identifying unknown targets through scrutiny of an individual’s social
networks is known as link analysis. Statement of Nathan A. Sales, Asst. Prof.,
George Mason Sch. of Law, PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD.,
WORKSHOP REGARDING SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS OPERATED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT & SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 2 (July 9, 2013).
67. This is the current state of the law according to the third-party doctrine. See infra notes 81–92 and accompanying text (discussing the third-party
doctrine).
68. After the Section 215 program became public in 2013, President
Obama slightly curtailed its scope; the USA FREEDOM ACT of 2015 then enacted several modifications, including a bar on bulk collection. See Jennifer
Steinhauer & Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Surveillance in Place Since 9/11 Is
Sharply Limited, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
06/03/us/politics/senate-surveillance-bill-passes-hurdle-but-showdown-looms
.html.
69. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012). Contrast this to the Section 215 program,
which collected only metadata, which traditionally enjoys much less constitutional protection than content.
70. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (distinguishing
a prior case which acquired the contents of a phone conversation from acquiring the number dialed).
71. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2). Upon discovery that “a Section 702 target is a
U.S. person or was inside the United States at the time of targeting, the gov-
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cludes the contents of phone calls and email, as well as instant
messages, Facebook messages, web browsing history, and
Skype conversations. 72 And while the government may neither
target a U.S. person nor target a foreigner for the purpose of
acquiring a particular U.S. person’s communications, communications collected under this program necessarily include
someone in the U.S. 73 This results, of course, in the collection of
“a significant amount of information about U.S. persons.” 74 Analysts may then query the database of Section 702–acquired information using a seed associated with a U.S. person, thus accessing any conversation that a particular U.S. person had with
an overseas target.
The aggregation problem arises outside the foreign intelligence context as well. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor eloquently
made plain in her concurrence in United States v. Jones, aggregating information about an individual’s location over a substantial period of time generates “a wealth of detail about her
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.” 75 Investigators can extract location information by aggregating sufficiently extensive networks of cell tower simulaernment must stop the collection immediately,” but is permitted to “waive” the
general requirement that such communications must be destroyed. PRIVACY &
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 127 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-report.pdf [hereinafter PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT].
72. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 120
(2015).
73. PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 71, at 127–33.
74. Id. at 133; see also Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism
Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN (June 7,
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data.
75. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Similar information could be acquired by collecting CSLI in bulk. For
a discussion of CSLI, see supra note 40. To date, no government agency has
tried to acquire a comprehensive database of all CSLI (as far as I am aware),
but a sufficient number of cell tower simulators deployed across a particular
geographical area, would provide the same data. A query of a widely distributed network of automatic license plate readers (ALPR) fed into a single database regarding a particular individual’s vehicle—a criminal suspect, an exgirlfriend—would also return a map of that individual’s movements. In a 2011
survey by the Police Executive Research Forum, seventy-one percent of responding agencies used ALPRs and eighty-five percent planned to acquire or
increase their use over the next five years. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM,
HOW ARE INNOVATIONS IN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFORMING POLICING? 31 (2012),
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/how%20are%20
innovations%20in%20technology%20transforming%20policing%202012.pdf.
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tors, surveillance cameras, automatic license plate reader
(ALPR) technology, biometric information, or databases with
records from companies such as E-Z pass, Travelocity, or Hotels.com.76
You might wonder why we should be concerned about the
information that the government collects and the kind of conclusions it can draw from aggregating and searching that information. After all, doesn’t the Fourth Amendment protect our
privacy? Wouldn’t the Constitution bar the government’s access
to truly private information absent probable cause to believe
criminal activity is afoot? As the next Part will make plain, the
answer to both of these questions is an emphatic no.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW’S FAILURE
To fall within the Fourth Amendment’s ambit, government
action must qualify as a search or seizure. The current regime
defining searches for Fourth Amendment purposes began in
1967, with Katz v. United States. 77 In Katz, the Supreme Court
rejected the idea that the Fourth Amendment regulates only
physical trespasses by government officials, holding that it protects “people, not places.” 78 As a result, collecting the contents
of a phone call made from a public telephone booth qualified as
a search requiring a warrant.79 Since Katz, the Fourth
Amendment has regulated any government activity that violates an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 80
Such activity constitutes a search and must comply with
constitutional limits. Usually those limits require the government to secure a warrant from a neutral magistrate based upon
probable cause.
As Section A demonstrates, however, under contemporary
doctrine, a great deal of information collection does not violate
a reasonable expectation of privacy; even when it does, an exception to the warrant requirement often applies. Moreover,
76. The FBI’s database of biometric information includes millions of photographs. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: FBI SHOULD BETTER ENSURE PRIVACY AND ACCURACY 10 (2016),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677098.pdf. This database is used by both federal and state investigators. Id. at 11.
77. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Prior to Katz, the Fourth Amendment regulated
government activity that physically invaded protected spaces, like houses or
offices. Id. at 352–53.
78. Id. at 351.
79. Id. at 353.
80. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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the absence of constitutional limits regarding the government’s
use of that information, as Section B will explain, magnifies
any concerns raised by the dearth of Fourth Amendment limits
on collection. Section C will then demonstrate how recent Supreme Court cases reveal the tension that the power of information aggregation is currently creating within Fourth
Amendment doctrine.
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S PERMISSIVE INFORMATION
COLLECTION RULES
This Section discusses two circumstances in which the
warrant requirement does not apply. First, what I call Fourth
Amendment exemptions refer to instances in which the collection at issue does not qualify as a search or seizure. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Katz’s reasonable-expectationof-privacy test places an enormous amount of information—
some of it highly sensitive—in this category. Second, I refer to
instances where the Fourth Amendment applies but the government need not secure a warrant as warrant requirement exceptions. In those circumstances, the government action must
merely be reasonable, a determination courts make by balancing the government’s interest in collection against the intrusiveness of the search or seizure. This Section will show how
these exemptions and exceptions often swallow the Fourth
Amendment rule.
Three preliminary points are in order. First, this Section
does not provide an exhaustive catalog of Fourth Amendment
exceptions and exemptions. It should, however, illustrate the
permissiveness of the overall regime. Second, in this Article I
take no position in the heated, long-running debate regarding
the appropriate scope of existing exemptions and exceptions.
Instead, I simply expound existing doctrine. Third, I recognize
that the collection of information that enjoys no Fourth
Amendment protection may nevertheless be subject to statutory or regulatory limits. As I explain in Part III, infra, I find
those types of limits unsatisfactory as a general matter; moreover, even with the most stringent collection rules, the aggregation problem would still present a privacy threat.
1. Fourth Amendment Exemptions
Of the numerous Fourth Amendment exemptions, those responsible for most of the investigative activity relevant to the
aggregation problem come from one of two doctrines. First is
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the third-party doctrine, by far the most significant Fourth
Amendment exemption. 81 The doctrine provides that any information we voluntarily reveal to a third party—a term encompassing any individual or nongovernmental institution—
enjoys no Fourth Amendment protection.82 In Smith v. Maryland, one of the doctrine’s foundational cases, the Supreme
Court held that law enforcement’s collection of the list of phone
numbers that a criminal suspect dialed did not constitute a
search because the suspect should have reasonably expected
that his telecommunications provider kept track of such information and he had therefore voluntarily relinquished it. 83 By
relinquishing this information to another, the doctrine reasons,
one cedes any reasonable expectation of privacy in it. 84
Consider what is included in this category of information:
phone records identifying who you associate with; bank records
showing who you do business with; credit card records revealing where you eat, shop, and seek entertainment; medical records listing your prescriptions; the records of cable companies
and video-streaming services exposing what you watch; Internet browsing history indicating whether you have searched for
symptoms of disease or investigated substance abuse treatment
options; and travel records from airlines, hotels, rental car
companies, or other third parties like Orbitz or Kayak. 85 The
third-party doctrine also denies Fourth Amendment protections
to information that private firms gather from your appliances. 86
81. The third-party doctrine has never been well loved by commentators,
and members of the academy continue to produce suggestions to eliminate or
modify it. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 8, at 563–64 nn.5–11 (compiling a list of
critiques of third-party doctrine); Peter P. Swire, Katz Is Dead. Long Live
Katz., 102 MICH. L. REV. 904 (2004); see also sources cited supra note 8.
82. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
83. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 743–45.
84. Id.
85. See Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 8, at 1090–91.
86. Id. A particularly aggressive interpretation of the third-party doctrine
was also used to justify the NSA’s warrantless bulk collection of telephone
metadata. Under that program, rather than simply collecting the call records
of a particular individual, as it had done in Smith, the government collected
all of the telephony metadata recorded by communications providers of all
calls made through their system where one or both ends of the communication
were in the United States. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 795–99 (2d Cir.
2015); see also supra notes 70–85 and accompanying text, infra notes 87–110
and accompanying text. And, because both the government and the FISC
agreed that telephone metadata qualified as third-party records that are not
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To be sure, some of the data subject to collection under the
third-party doctrine is subject to statutory or policy-based
rules. To collect an individual’s communications metadata under Section 215, for example, the government must certify that
the “information likely to be obtained” is “relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities.”87 And the Attorney General
must “include privacy protections that apply to the collection,
retention, and use of information concerning United States persons.” 88 Medical records also enjoy statutory protection.89 But
as privacy scholars have demonstrated repeatedly, the existing
legal framework for protecting individual privacy is, on the
whole, outdated and incomplete. 90
Note that the principle behind the third-party doctrine—
the idea that anything you have voluntarily provided to a third
party lacks Fourth Amendment protection—is not limited to
written records. The third-party doctrine’s close cousin, sometimes referred to as the “false friend” doctrine, applies the same
idea to spoken conversations. 91 There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in what someone voluntarily tells an interlocutor, even if—unbeknownst to the speaker—she happens to be a
government agent or informant. 92 This doctrine allows law enforcement or intelligence officials to attend and record (or task
informants to attend and record) religious or political gatherentitled to Fourth Amendment protection, the government was able to assemble a vast database made up of an enormous volume of Americans’ telephone
communications records, both domestic and international, with no constitutionally imposed limits. Amended Memorandum Opinion at 3, In re Application of FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109 (FISA Ct., Aug. 29, 2013).
87. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (2012). Metadata collected in the criminal context must be “relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3122(b)(2) (2012).
88. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(h)(1).
89. Slobogin, supra note 24, at 158.
90. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, A User ’s Guide to the Stored Communications
Act, and a Legislator ’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208,
1233 (2004) (noting that one particular privacy statute is “vague in some places, overly complex in others, and underprotective of privacy interests in others”); Slobogin, supra note 24, at 149–67 (describing limited privacy protections for information other than communications content); Daniel J. Solove &
Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L.
REV. 357, 364–68 (2006) (describing the “limits of U.S. privacy law”); see
sources cited infra notes 251–52.
91. Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81
MISS. L.J. 1309, 1326 (2012).
92. E.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 296 (1966).
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ings as well as individual conversations.
While the third-party doctrine is the most noteworthy
Fourth Amendment exemption, another is also quite significant. The Supreme Court held in Knotts v. United States that
when government officials collect information about one’s physical location in a public place—even if aided by an electronic
tracking device—that collection is neither a search nor a seizure. 93 The Court reasoned that people “traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares” voluntarily convey the details
of their travels “to anyone who want[s] to look.” 94 Under a
broad reading of Knotts, the government could argue that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to any location-tracking
method so long as the government has not trespassed on private property to collect the information. 95 Cell site location information (CSLI) gathered through the use of a cell tower simulator or from a communications provider, 96 video surveillance
paired with facial-recognition software, toll records, or license
plate readers all can be viewed simply as a means of collecting
location information. So long as the resulting data is limited to
locations in public places, Knotts arguably permits such acquisition as merely the gathering of information voluntarily divulged to the public at large. Regulations addressing these
forms of collection, if they exist, vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 97
2. Warrant Requirement Exceptions
In circumstances where the Fourth Amendment applies
but the warrant requirement does not, the traditional limits of
ex ante review, probable cause, and particularity become fall
away. In these cases, the Fourth Amendment merely requires
that, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, the
government search or seizure is “reasonable.” Courts determine
93. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983); see also United
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (holding that the use of a beeper to track a
person’s location was not a search under the Fourth Amendment until the
beeper entered a home).
94. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82; cf. Karo, 468 U.S. at 731–32 (holding that
the Fourth Amendment is only violated by the warrantless location search of a
container at the moment it enters a private home).
95. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
96. For information on CSLI’s constitutional status, see discussion supra
note 40.
97. Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 90, at 380–82.
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whether government action is reasonable by balancing the government’s interest against the intrusiveness of the search; reasonableness sometimes, but not always, requires individualized
suspicion.98
The most important warrant requirement exception for the
purposes of this Article is the foreign-intelligence-surveillance
exception. 99 Under this exception, the government need not secure a warrant to collect information with foreign intelligence
value. 100 In In re Directives, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) 101 held that, “a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement exists when surveillance is conducted to obtain foreign
intelligence for national security purposes and is directed
against [targets] reasonably believed to be located outside the
United States.” 102 The FISCR also found the surveillance pro98. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding stop-and-frisk
searches permissible with reasonable suspicion that the person is “armed and
presently dangerous”); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–300 (1967) (creating an “exigent circumstances exception” to the warrant requirement for
home searches); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (allowing
for warrantless search of vehicles with reasonable suspicion of crime); see also
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393–95 (1985) (extending vehicle exception
to mobile homes in certain circumstances).
99. The foreign intelligence surveillance exception is actually just one application of a broader warrant requirement exception known as the special
needs doctrine. That doctrine provides that a warrantless search may be justified when special needs, “beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” make
the warrant and probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment impracticable. E.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun,
J., concurring). Under this rationale, the Supreme Court has approved as consistent with the Fourth Amendment: (1) the U.S. Customs’ Service’s mandatory drug testing of employees seeking promotion to positions involving interdiction of illegal drugs, requiring them to carry firearms, or requiring them to
handle classified materials; (2) a school district’s random drug testing for student athletes; (3) the search of a probationer ’s home; and (4) numerous other
contexts. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Nat’l Treasury
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989); Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868, 873, 875 (1987). See also Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92
v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (holding that individualized suspicion is not required to justify random drug testing of students involved in extracurricular
activities); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (holding
that warrantless drug and alcohol tests for railway employees were reasonable
even in the absence of reasonable suspicion that any particular employee was
impaired).
100. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.
101. FISA created a Court of Review (FISCR), made up of three federal district or appeals court judges appointed by the Chief Justice, to hear appeals
from decisions of the FISC. 50 U.S.C § 1803 (2012).
102. In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004, 1012 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008). In re Direc-
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gram as a whole reasonable and therefore lawful under the
Fourth Amendment. 103
This case gave a green light to the Section 702 program’s
collection of non-U.S. persons’ electronic communications, so
long as the target is “reasonably believed to be located outside
the United States.” 104 If the government directly targeted U.S.
persons for their international electronic communications, such
surveillance would indisputably require individualized probable cause. 105 Yet because the program both qualifies for the foreign-intelligence-surveillance exception to the warrant requirement and has been deemed reasonable by the FISCR, the
Fourth Amendment poses no obstacle to this collection—even
in the absence of individualized suspicion about the overseas
target’s American interlocutors. 106
As with communications metadata, Section 702 collection
and the use of the resulting data are subject to some statutory,
policy-based, and judicially imposed limits. 107 For example, a
“significant purpose” of the collection must be to gather foreign
intelligence information—a relatively expansive category 108—
tives involved a challenge to the temporary Protect America Act (PAA), Pub. L.
No. 110-55, § 105B, 121 Stat. 552 (2007). The PAA was replaced in 2008 by the
FISA Amendments Act (FAA), Pub. L. No. 110-261 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1881a–g).
103. In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1012–15. The FISCR held that the surveillance met the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement in light of
the government’s interest in protecting national security and the “matrix of
safeguards” that mitigated the intrusiveness of the program. Id.
104. Id. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2).
105. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972);
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1805.
106. In re Directives implied that an executive order requiring the Attorney
General to have probable cause to believe that the targeted person is a foreign
power or its agent was one of several constitutionally compelled procedural
protections. In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1014.
107. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861, 1881a; ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ATT’Y GEN.
OF U.S., PROCEDURES USED BY THE NSA FOR TARGETING NON-UNITED STATES
PERSONS REASONABLY BELIEVED TO BE LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED
STATES (2009) (detailing NSA targeting procedures); Berman, supra note 33,
at 806–17 (detailing the judicially imposed limits on Section 215 and Section
702 data); Peter Margulies, Reauthorizing the FISA Amendments Act: A Blueprint for Enhancing Privacy Protections and Preserving Foreign Intelligence
Capabilities, 12 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 23, 37–39 (2016) (describing judicially and
executive-branch-imposed limits on data collection).
108. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e). A target of Section 702 surveillance “could be
completely innocent.” Hearing on Oversight and Reauthorization of the FISA
Amendments Act: The Balance Between National Security, Privacy and Civil
Liberties Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 7 (2016) (statement of David Medine, Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
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but it need not be the only purpose. 109 Indeed the primary purpose of the collection could be something totally unrelated—
such as a criminal investigation.110 And while queries of the
Section 702–acquired information are themselves subject to
rules developed in conjunction with the FISA, 111 those rules do
not prevent the most troubling practice (from a Fourth
Amendment perspective, anyway): analysts may perform socalled U.S. person queries, which ask for communications involving a particular U.S. person. Such a query returns all international communications that U.S. person engaged in with
any overseas target, regardless of its foreign intelligence value. 112 This occurs despite the statute barring the targeting of
U.S. persons for collection. 113
Other courts have relied on the foreign-intelligencesurveillance exception to bless the warrantless search of a U.S.
citizen’s home in Kenya 114 as well as New York City’s suspicionless searches of individuals riding the subway. 115 The list of
warrant requirement exceptions is long—it includes searches or
seizures of items in plain view, border searches, 116 inventory
searches, consent searches, and more.117
Board). For an argument that a broad definition of “foreign intelligence information” is necessary to successful diplomacy, see Peter Margulies, Defining
“Foreign Affairs” in Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act: The Virtues and
Deficits of Post-Snowden Dialogue on U.S. Surveillance Policy, 72 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1283, 1283–87 (2015).
109. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(v).
110. The NSA determines who will be targeted, but the FBI may “nominate” targets. PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 71, at 47.
111. See NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, U.S. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE, USSID SP0018, LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND U.S. PERSONS MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES § 4 (2011); NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY
THE NSA IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT § 3 (2007); William C. Banks, Next Generation Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law: Renewing 702, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 671, 672–88 (2017)
(detailing nonconstitutional limits on Section 702 data collection and use).
112. In 2016, the government (not including the FBI, which is exempt from
reporting requirements) used 5288 search terms associated with a U.S. person. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY
REPORT REGARDING USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES FOR CALENDAR
YEAR 2016, at 8 (2017).
113. In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004, 1012–15 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
114. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93 (2d
Cir. 2008).
115. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006) (permitting application
of the special needs exception to a warrantless search where the subject of a
search possesses a full privacy expectation).
116. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (finding that
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This brief discussion of a couple of those exceptions, however, shows that the default Fourth Amendment rule requiring
a showing of probable cause, identification of the object of the
search or seizure with particularity, and ex ante approval by a
neutral magistrate does not always apply. In fact, there are
many circumstances in which the government constitutionally
may collect large swaths of information about Americans without satisfying one or more of the traditional Fourth Amendment limits, and often without any individualized suspicion at
all.
B. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S (NON)EXISTING USERESTRICTION RULES
The government’s broad collection rules plainly raise their
own privacy concerns, but even if they did not, postcollection
use would still pose such threats. Indeed, the government’s
broad collection power might not be so alarming if there were
reliable limits on how the government used the information in
its possession. As this Section will demonstrate, however, the
conventional wisdom is that once data is in the government’s
hands, the Constitution has nothing to say at all.118 In the
routine searches of people and their effects at the border are “reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border ”). The advent of digital
storage devices, such as laptops, cell phones, and thumb drives, has generated
numerous questions regarding the application of the border search doctrine to
the contents of these devices. The Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on
the issue, but courts addressing the question have consistently held that routine inspection of electronic media—which would include booting up a device,
reviewing its contents, and using search functions to find and review specific
files—is permissible, even in the absence of suspicion. See, e.g., United States
v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 549 (D. Md. 2014); United States v. Ickes,
393 F.3d 501, 502–03 (4th Cir. 2005). The rule is slightly less permissive when
it comes to forensic border searches, which generally entail making a mirror of
the entire contents of the digital device, and then subjecting that copy to scrutiny using analytic software to recover hidden, deleted, or encrypted data. See
Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 547–48. To engage in forensic searches, the government must have individualized suspicion, which is not a particularly high
bar. Id. at 570 (“ This standard is far from onerous.”).
117. See Investigations and Police Practices—Warrantless Searches and
Seizures, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 48 (2015) (listing additional exceptions to the warrant requirement).
118. E.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d
1162, 1173 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It goes without saying that lawfully seized evidence may not be suppressed.”); Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 67–68 (1st
Cir. 2010) (retaining a former offender ’s DNA profile “does not constitute a
separate search under the Fourth Amendment”); see also Balkin, supra note
55, at 20 (“[B]ecause the Fourth Amendment focuses on searches and seizures,
it places few limits on collation and analysis.”); Joh, supra note 11, at 63 (“If
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words of one respected jurist, “the [F]ourth [A]mendment does
not control how properly collected information is deployed.” 119
Whatever logic this constitutional vacuum may have had
in the past, the absence of use restrictions cannot persist in the
face of the convergence of two factors. First, there remains very
little information about what we do, where we go, what we purchase, or with whom we communicate that some third party
does not record and store digitally. This means the government
will have access to an ever-growing amount of information
about each individual American. Similarly, we now live in a
networked world. Many Americans have family, friends, or
business associates all around the globe. With international
communications ubiquitous and—so long as you can find a WiFi connection—free, long distance phone charges are a thing of
the past. Moreover, much of this international interaction takes
place through modes of communication—e-mails, instant messages, video and voice chats, videos, photos, voice-over-IP (such
as Skype or FaceTime), and other digital tools—that are subject
to collection under the Section 702 program.120 Accordingly, a
great deal more of our communications are likely vulnerable to
collection.
Second, contemporary technology permits the government
to collect, store, aggregate, and analyze large volumes of data
in ways that were either unavailable or cost prohibitive for
most of America’s history. 121 So even as we generate more and
more digital information about ourselves, the government’s ca[information] acquisition is permissible, how the police use that information
thereafter is generally not subject to an additional Fourth Amendment challenge.”); Kerr, supra note 22, at 6 (“If the government comes across information legally, then it is free to use that information however officials would
like.”); Erin Murphy, Back to the Future: The Curious Case of United States v.
Jones, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 330–31 (2012) (“Current Fourth Amendment law emphasizes acquisition . . . . It cares little for what happens next—to
what use that information is put.”); William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill
Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842,
857 (2001) (“Fourth Amendment law regulates the government’s efforts to uncover information, but it says nothing about what the government may do with
the information it uncovers.”).
119. Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring).
120. Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 74; see also supra notes 70–110
and accompanying text (describing the Section 702 program).
121. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801
(2004) (discussing the impact of changing technologies on Fourth Amendment
doctrine).
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pacity for exploiting that information grows.122 Thanks to contemporary technology, government information collection and
analysis powers have grown substantially in recent decades.
And while over time there have been some technology-driven
changes to constitutional rules regarding government collection, the rules (or lack of them) when it comes to information
use have remained stagnant.
C. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Two recent Supreme Court cases starkly illustrate the
pressure that modern technology places on existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine. In United States v. Jones and Riley v.
California, the Supreme Court recognized the transformative
nature of data aggregation and considered whether current
doctrine needs to be modified in response.123 United States v.
Jones presented almost exactly the same question that Knotts
considered nearly three decades earlier—whether tracking a
vehicle’s location on public thoroughfares over time constitutes
a search 124—a question that Knotts answered in the negative. 125 Jones presented the issue, however, in a more technologically sophisticated context: whether law enforcement had
engaged in an unlawful search when it placed a GPS device on
a suspect’s car without a valid warrant and used it to collect a
detailed account of his movements over the course of several
weeks.
122. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 10, at 497 (comparing an
automobile tracking device to the historic practice of police following a defendant on a highway or street).
123. The need for Fourth Amendment doctrine to accommodate technological change did not suddenly arise for the first time in the twenty-first century.
Doctrine began grappling with technology’s effects by at least the 1920s. In
United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927), for example, the Supreme Court
held that the Coast Guard did not engage in a search when it used a searchlight to illuminate otherwise hidden cases of alcohol on a boat during the Prohibition Era. See also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding
that the use of a thermal imaging device to monitor the radiation of heat from
a home is a search). Throughout American history, as investigative methods
have evolved, courts have continuously recalibrated the doctrine, sometimes
announcing new rules, sometimes simply explaining how the old rules applied
to new contexts. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967);
see also Kerr, supra note 27, at 531 (explaining how courts adjust Fourth
Amendment doctrine in response to technology to maintain the balance of
power between would-be criminals and the government).
124. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012).
125. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983); see also supra notes
93–95 and accompanying text.
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While the Jones majority opinion rested its holding that
this did constitute a search on the decidedly nontechnological
fact that government officials “physically occupied private
property” when they placed the GPS device on Jones’s car, 126
two concurrences (representing five justices) recognized that
the case implicated larger questions about how the Fourth
Amendment should approach technological advances. Justice
Alito argued that long-term GPS surveillance violates a reasonable expectation of privacy.127 Justice Sotomayor explained
how several technological factors have combined to change the
nature—and hence the intrusiveness—of location information
since the Court decided Knotts. 128 Contemporary monitoring
tools provide a much more detailed, complete set of data, 129 and
are much more likely to be used because they are cheap and invisible.130 Justice Alito made a similar point when observing
that, “[i]n the precomputer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical.
Traditional surveillance for any extended period of time was
difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.” 131 Moreover, Sotomayor pointed out, once collected, the government can
“store such records and efficiently mine them for information
years into the future.” 132 As a result, Justice Sotomayor concluded, such collection is fundamentally different in kind from
physical surveillance aided by a beeper like the one in
126. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
127. Id. at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 414–16 (noting the extensive personal information that use of
GPS devices can generate, including “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque,
synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on”).
130. Id. at 416 (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)) (noting
the low cost and minimal manpower required for GPS surveillance allow the
government to evade “the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility’”); see also
Jones, 565 U.S. at 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that historically the
most effective privacy protections were practical rather than constitutional or
statutory and that the monitoring at issue in Jones “would have required a
large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance,” a use
of resources that would only have been limited to “investigation[s] of unusual
importance”); Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the
Cost of Surveillance: Making Cents out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 335, 341–50 (2014).
131. Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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Knotts.133 Courts must “take these attributes,” she argues, “into
account when considering the existence of a reasonable societal
expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public movements.” 134
To be sure, the government might obtain the exact same
information through analog surveillance techniques as it could
via long-term GPS monitoring.135 But this does not mean that
GPS monitoring poses the same level of intrusion as conventional surveillance. For most of our history, practical impediments precluded law enforcement from collecting the information captured by GPS devices. Law enforcement is unlikely
to invest the resources required to follow someone like Jones,
who was suspected of possession with the intent to distribute
cocaine, twenty-four hours a day for several weeks. Moreover,
due to these practical constraints, courts never had to face the
question whether months-long twenty-four-hour surveillance
constituted a search. Hence Justice Sotomayor’s conclusion
that the surveillance at issue in Jones presented a novel question not controlled by short-term surveillance cases like Knotts.
In eliminating these practical obstacles to physical surveillance, technological advances do not only permit more collection. More importantly, the volume of collection amounts to an
entirely new sort of surveillance: the results of aggregating that
data, enabling the government to extract knowledge (intimate
details abut our daily lives, activities, and relationships) in
which we have always had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Now that technology has eliminated the practical obstacle to
aggregating large amounts of location information, the courts
must erect a doctrinal bulwark to protect that expectation of
privacy.
In other words, certain technology, when combined with
storage and analysis capacity, raises the aggregation problem
in a way that implicates reasonable expectations of privacy. At
least five members of the Court recognized the distinction between government access to information revealed piecemeal (an
individual’s location in public at any given moment in time)
and access to an extensive dossier assembled by aggregating
many isolated pieces of information (the compilation of weeks
of information about Jones’s vehicle’s location).136 The D.C. Cir133.
134.
135.
136.
ring).

Id.
Id. at 416.
Id. at 415.
See id. at 413, 418 (Sotomayor, J., concurring and Alito, J., concur-
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cuit Court’s Judge Ginsburg perhaps put it best when he explained in the lower court’s opinion in Jones that,
It is one thing for a passerby to observe or even to follow someone
during a single journey as he goes to the market or returns home from
work. It is another thing entirely for that stranger to pick up the
scent again the next day and the day after that, week in and week
out, dogging his prey until he has identified all the places, people,
amusements, and chores that make up that person’s hitherto private
routine. 137

So while we may have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
one piece of information about our location in public, the calculus regarding long-term GPS surveillance is different, given the
conclusions one can draw from the aggregation of location information spanning several weeks.
In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court also acknowledged the potential intrusiveness facilitated by modern technology’s ability to aggregate large amounts of information. 138
Riley presented the question whether law enforcement officials
may, without a warrant, search the digital information contained on a smartphone seized in a search incident to arrest. 139
In searching David Riley upon his arrest for driving on a suspended license, the arresting officer found Riley’s smartphone
in his pocket and looked through it, discovering evidence that
Riley had gang connections. 140 The Court had to decide whether
the information gleaned from the cell phone was lawfully collected or whether its collection exceeded the scope of the
search-incident-to-arrest warrant exception.141
Again, the Court—this time in an opinion joined by all nine
justices—took the broader view of the Fourth Amendment’s
protections, pointing to the ways in which new technology
changed the analysis on which the search-incident-to-arrest
doctrine relied. While smartphones like Riley’s were unheard of
ten years ago, the Court noted, “a significant majority of American adults now own such phones.” 142 Moreover, these phones
137. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff ’d
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
138. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
139. Searches incident to arrest, in which an arresting officer may search
the arrestee’s person and immediate surroundings to ensure the preservation
of evidence and officer safety, are a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (acknowledging the
permissible scope of such searches has long been a source of debate).
140. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2484.
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grant access to “vast quantities of personal information.” 143 So
while “a mechanical application” of doctrine “might well support the warrantless search,” the Court determined that such
an application was inappropriate when it comes to
smartphones. 144 Permitting such devices to be searched with no
warrant would pose a significantly greater intrusion into individual privacy than a traditional search incident to arrest of
the nondigital contents of one’s pockets. 145
As with GPS-generated location data, the privacy implications of smartphone data distinguishes it from familiar presmartphone contexts not only in volume but also in the nature
of the information.146 A phone with Internet access will have
search and browsing history, which could reveal an individual’s
private interests or concerns—“perhaps a search for certain
symptoms of disease, coupled with frequent visits to
WebMD.” 147 Given the nature of the revelations that searches
of smartphone contents permit, the Court determined that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those contents, even in the course of a valid search incident to arrest. 148
Less recently, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the
ability of data aggregation to exacerbate privacy concerns in
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) context. 149 United
States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press considered a request under FOIA for a particular individual’s criminal record. 150 The Court rejected the request, holding that even though criminal records are publicly
available, disclosing a complete rap sheet would be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.151 The Court noted that,
“there is a vast difference between the public records that
might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, coun143. Id. at 2484–85; see also id. at 2488 (equating a search of all data
stored on a cell phone to a search of an arrestee’s wallet or purse was “like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the
moon” because both are ways to get “from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping them together ”).
144. Id. at 2484.
145. Id. at 2488–89.
146. Id. at 2489.
147. Id. at 2490.
148. Id. at 2493.
149. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966)
(as amended).
150. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489
U.S. 749 (1989).
151. Id. at 763–70.
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ty archives, and local police stations throughout the country
and a computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse
of information.” 152 As a result, it reasoned, there is a distinction
“between scattered disclosure of the bits of information contained in a rap sheet and revelation of the rap sheet as a
whole.” 153
As these cases show, the Supreme Court has already begun
to recognize that doctrine must account for the government’s
technology-enabled ability to glean new kinds of knowledge.
Both Jones and Riley, as well as commentators’ suggestions for
reforms,154 however, remain focused on the proper scope of collection, trying to calibrate what should be available to the government in the first place. I suggest below that rather than (or
in addition to) modifying collection rules, courts should employ
use restrictions, subjecting some uses of even lawfully collected
information to independent Fourth Amendment regulation.
The critical point here is that revelations that the government can glean by querying these databases are different in
kind from revelations gleaned by collection alone. That is to
say, more data is not necessarily just more data. More data can
mean different data. The aggregation problem means that the
right combination of multiple pieces of data can reveal data of
an entirely novel—and much more sensitive—nature. So while
basic information routinely revealed to the public at large (like
momentary location information) may lack constitutional significance, five Supreme Court Justices have indicated that the
government’s ability to build an individual’s profile beyond the
scope of what law enforcement agencies would acquire in the
absence of the ability to aggregate presents a distinct question.155
III. TREATING QUERIES AS SEARCHES
This Article argues that the best way to address the aggregation problem is to reject the idea that the Constitution should
remain indifferent to information use. Instead, doctrine should
acknowledge that some postcollection and aggregation uses of
information qualify as Fourth Amendment events in their own
152. Id. at 763–64.
153. Id.
154. See supra sources cited in note 8.
155. Benjamin J. Priester, Five Answers and Three Questions After United
States v. Jones (2012), the Fourth Amendment “GPS Case,” 65 OKLA. L. REV.
491, 522 (2013).
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right. This Part makes the case that some queries of aggregated databases for information about U.S. persons constitute
such a use. Section A argues that there some queries violate
reasonable expectations of privacy just as surely as some physical searches do, and that those queries should be regulated as
searches. 156 Section B offers a means to implement this suggestion by demonstrating that the FISA Court has provided a
model for such regulation. Finally, Section C discusses why use
restrictions must derive from the Constitution, rather than
from statutory or regulatory sources.
Before turning to my argument, however, a clarification is
in order: there is a distinction between analyzing large data
sets in search of patterns—what is typically referred to as data
mining—and querying a data set for information about a particular U.S. person.157 Retrieving information using query-andreport tools identifies what responsive bits of information a database contains about a specific individual, whereas data mining uses automated processes to discover patterns within the
data. My argument applies only to queries. There may be instances when data mining is sufficiently invasive that it, too,
should be considered a search; that, however, is a question for
another paper. 158
A. WHY (AT LEAST SOME) QUERIES ARE SEARCHES
As noted above, courts determine what qualifies as a
Fourth Amendment search by employing the inquiry first announced in Justice Harlan’s seminal concurrence in Katz v.
United States, which instructs that the Fourth Amendment
156. I take no position here on how these searches should be regulated—
i.e., whether they should require probable cause and warrants or whether
some less demanding standard of review, such as reasonable suspicion, would
be appropriate.
157. Data mining is the “process of identifying valid, novel, potentially useful and ultimately understandable patterns in data” or “the application of database technology and techniques—such as statistical analysis and modeling—
to uncover hidden patterns . . . .” 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.7(e) (5th ed. 2012) (citations and
internal quotations omitted); see also Taipale, supra note 58, at 37–39 (2003)
(noting the difference between data aggregation analyzed with subject-based
queries and the use of actual data mining).
158. Imagine, for example, that an algorithm identifies the following pattern: individuals who have both attended services at a mosque and traveled to
South Asia are more likely to access terrorist propaganda online. It is not clear
whether extracting a list of names of individuals who meet that pattern is any
less invasive than a query about a specific individual. I hope to explore this
and related questions about other forms of data use in future work.
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regulates government activity when it violates an individual’s
“reasonable expectation of privacy.” 159 Like the third-party doctrine, the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test is subjected to
its fair share of criticism, due in large part to its indeterminacy—it is often impossible to divine ex ante whether a court will
find that a given set of facts violates a reasonable expectation
of privacy. 160 Determining which expectations of privacy are
reasonable is therefore more art than science. 161 Yet Katz remains the law of the land.
In this Section, I argue that, at the very least, a query constitutes a search if it returns information whose exposure clearly would qualify as a search if that exposure was achieved by
collection rather than query. In other words, when queries result in revelations that the Supreme Court has held would violate an expectation of privacy if achieved through collection,
that query is a search. In such cases, the reasonable expectation of privacy is no less violated because it was accomplished
through a query rather than a more traditional search.
159. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
160. For a representative catalogue of the scholarly critiques of the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, see William Baude & James Y. Stern, The
Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1825
n.7 (2016) (collecting articles critiquing the test as ambiguous, subjective, unpredictable, conceptually confused, and circular). As the leading treatise on
searches and seizures puts it, the Supreme Court in Katz rejected the thenexisting, arguably outmoded, Fourth Amendment principles while offering “little to fill the void” it had created. LAFAVE, supra note 157 § 2.1(a) (“ The Supreme Court . . . has never managed to set out a comprehensive definition of
the word ‘searches’ as it is used in the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Anthony
G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
403 (1974) (arguing that the question whether something is a search is “a value judgment” regarding how much “privacy and freedom” may be diminished
by government surveillance before the Constitution imposes restraints); Orin
S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503,
504 (2007) (“[N]o one seems to know what makes an expectation of privacy
constitutionally ‘reasonable.’”).
161. Of course the Supreme Court has made clear that some collection activities definitively constitute a search. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (finding that the examination of interior of private home
with thermal imaging sensor was a search). Conversely, others definitively do
not. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (holding that police examination of contents of an individual’s trash left at the curb for collection was not a search); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (holding
that police surveillance of private property from a plane in navigable airspace
was not a search). For cases that present novel facts, the Supreme Court’s
eventual outcome is often unclear. See supra notes 81–92 and accompanying
text (discussing the third-party doctrine).
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When queries return information whose collection by other
means arguably violates a reasonable expectation of privacy,
but the courts have not yet determined whether those means
constitute a search, the question becomes more difficult. The
government’s acquisition of long-term location information
about an individual provides a good example. Case law does not
clearly indicate whether this acquisition violates a reasonable
expectation of privacy and therefore constitutes a search. A
query that returns long-term location information by aggregating information from multiple sources—say CSLI, license plate
reader records, toll records, and facial recognition paired with
surveillance camera footage—therefore may or may not qualify
as a search, depending on how the Supreme Court ultimately
decides the question. When faced with knowledge acquired by
query whose independent collection does not violate a clearly
established reasonable expectation of privacy, courts must
simply engage in the same analysis that they perform when
faced with a new form of collection. They will have to apply the
Katz test, and make a judgment regarding whether the exposure of that information should be labeled a search. While this
leaves uncertainty regarding which queries are permitted, the
same is true of new collection methods until the courts resolve
their status. When it comes to CSLI, for example, the government has implemented a policy of seeking warrants out of an
abundance of caution while we await the Supreme Court’s ruling. It could take the same approach to queries whose status is
uncertain.
Queries of Section 702–acquired information using U.S.
person identifiers present a stark example of the first type of
query.162 Americans unquestionably have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of our electronic communications
and to collect them directly the government must first obtain ex
ante judicial approval, based on probable cause, in the form of a
warrant or a FISC order. 163 Queries seeking U.S. person information in Section 702–aquired information—which includes a
“potentially very large” volume of “communications between
lawful targets and U.S. persons that are not the type of com-

162. For a description of the Section 702 program, see supra notes 70–110
and accompanying text.
163. 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (2012) (discussing foreign intelligence investigations); 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (discussing criminal investigations).
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munications Section 702 was not designed to collect” 164 that
may “include family photographs, love letters, personal financial matters, discussions of physical and mental health, and political and religious exchanges” 165—can yield this normally constitutionally protected data with no individualized suspicion,
particularity, or ex ante judicial approval. 166 The government
thus may “use queries to digitally compile the entire body of
communications” associated with an individual, even if that individual is a U.S. person. 167 And in fact, the FBI’s internal regulations permit exactly that. 168 Such queries have actually
come to be known as the Fourth Amendment’s backdoor loophole, because they arguably serve as an end-run around the
Fourth Amendment itself. 169 While information about the extent to which the government takes advantage of this “loophole” is imperfect, 170 a FISC judge discouraged Congress from

164. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 11, [Redacted] (FISA Ct., Oct. 16, 2015); see
also Transcript of Proceedings Held Before the Honorable Thomas F. Hogan at
5–6, In re [Redacted] (FISA Ct., Oct. 20, 2015) (arguing that the FBI’s rules
regarding Section 702 queries “do not provide sufficient safeguards of the U.S.
Person information that” Section 702 collects).
165. Hearing on Oversight and Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments
Act: The Balance Between National Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 7 (2016) (statement of David Medine, Chairman, Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board).
166. Professor Laura Donohue has argued that, when used to search for
violations of the criminal law, queries of Section 702–acquired material should
be considered searches requiring a warrant. Donohue, supra note 72, at 262–
63.
167. PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 71, at 131; see also id. at 127
(noting that the privacy implications of Section 702 are not limited to collection, “but must also consider how information about U.S. persons is treated
after collection”).
168. Memorandum Opinion & Order at 44, [Redacted] (FISA Ct., Nov. 6,
2015).
169. See, e.g., Elizabeth Goitein, The FBI’s Warrantless Surveillance Back
Door Just Opened a Little Wider, JUSTSECURITY (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www
.justsecurity.org/30699/fbis-warrantless-surveillance-door-opened-wider. A recent FISC opinion reached the opposite conclusion, determining that queries
using U.S. person identifiers did not render the Section 702 program unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. Memorandum Opinion & Order at
77, [Redacted] (FISA Ct., Nov. 6, 2015).
170. PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 71, at 130–31 (noting that
the FBI “does not separately designate [queries] that employ U.S. person identifiers, and so the number of [such] queries performed by the FBI is not
known” making “the manner in which the FBI is employing U.S. person queries . . . difficult to evaluate”).
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requiring ex ante authorization for such queries because they
are so common that the requests would swamp the court. 171
It is less certain whether the type of query at issue in the
Section 215 telephony metadata program or the GPS tracking
in Jones violates a reasonable expectation of privacy. These
types of cases of course present difficult line-drawing challenges. 172 In the Section 215 program, the government (1) collected
the metadata of all Americans’ phone calls (metadata not subject to Fourth Amendment protections because the government
secured it from a third party); (2) combined that metadata into
a single database; and (3) then queried that database in search
of as-yet-unknown terrorist operatives in the United States. 173
Without the capacity to aggregate these records, the government could acquire Individual X’s phone records and learn all
of the phone numbers with which Individual X communicates.174 If the government wanted to know more about the
communications of people who use the numbers with which Individual X is in contact, however, it would have to request individually the records associated with each of the numbers Individual X called or from whom Individual X received a call. And
if it wanted more information about the numbers with which
those numbers were in contact, it would have to do the same
thing again. A conservative estimate says that two such “hops”
would require the government to seek and review records associated with at least 10,000 phone numbers. 175 And if the government expanded the inquiry to three hops, the applicable
rule for most of the Section 215 program’s history, that number
would rise to around 2.5 million. 176 Just as law enforcement is
unlikely to follow Mr. Jones’s car twenty-four hours a day for
several weeks running, intelligence officials are unlikely to un171. Letter from Hon. John D. Bates, Dir., Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, to
Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Chair, U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, at 2
(Jan. 13, 2014).
172. See Simmons, supra note 22, at 7–8.
173. PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 62, at 21–31 (explaining access procedures for foreign intelligence and international terrorism investigations subject to Section 215).
174. Id. Section 215 requires only that the information sought be relevant
to an ongoing investigation.
175. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 31 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and
remanded, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (containing the estimate cited by the
court).
176. Noa Yachot, Writers, Lawmakers, and the NRA Support ACLU Challenge to NSA Spying, ACLU (Sept. 4, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national
-security/writers-lawmakers-and-nra-support-aclu-challenge-nsa-spying.
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dertake this chore on the off chance that they will spot a connection to a known terrorist.
Given a database that includes everyone’s phone records,
however, one query using Individual X’s phone number would
return all numbers within the specified number of hops.177 In
one mouse click, the government can discover not only the list
of individuals and institutions who were recipients or originators of Individual X’s phone calls, but also generate a map of
their entire communications network and the networks of everyone with whom they is in contact.178 Thus, even if we voluntarily relinquish our phone records to our communications provider, as the third-party doctrine assumes, the ability to map
our entire social and professional network and what the government may learn from it is far more intrusive than simply
gathering a list of numbers with which one person was in contact. Just as five justices believed that using a GPS tracking
device to combine data available to the government in unaggregated form violated a reasonable expectation of privacy, 179 so
too might this creation of an electronic rolodex violate an individual’s expectations of privacy, even if the collection of each
individual set of phone records does not.180 In cases like this, it
will not always be clear ex ante when a query will be considered a search. But the same is true of any application of the
Katz test to novel circumstances.181

177. In part for this reason, when Congress renewed Section 215 in the
USA FREEDOM ACT of 2015, it barred the government from amassing databases through the bulk collection of records. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub.
L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861).
178. See supra note 161 (referring to a graphics interchange format (GIF)
with map showing hops).
179. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
180. One district court implicitly accepted this premise when arguing that
the bulk metadata program did not present the same Fourth Amendment
question as that of third-party-records cases like Smith v. Maryland and
should not qualify for the third-party-records Fourth Amendment exemption.
Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 31.
181. See Kerr, supra note 160, at 503 (describing the difficulty in anticipating what constitutes a search under Katz as having “disappointed scholars and
frustrated students for four decades”). Indeed, judges have reached contrasting conclusions on the question whether the collection aspect of Section
215 constituted a search. Compare Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 31 (holding
that bulk telephony metadata should not qualify for the third-party exemption), with In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of
Tangible Things from [Redacted] (FISA Ct., Aug. 25, 2013) (holding that the
third-party doctrine applies to bulk telephony metadata).
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The issue of aggregating location data provides another example. In Jones, several of the justices believed the surveillance violated a reasonable expectation of privacy, and yet the
Court did not settle the question whether extended GPS surveillance constitutes a search in the absence of a physical trespass.182 The Fourth Amendment status of the collection of CSLI
remains similarly unsettled.183 Or imagine a database of all the
information gathered by a citywide network of license plate
readers. The government could query that database for all cars
that ran the red light at the intersection of Main and Broadway. Such a query seems to fall under the Knotts rule because
it is isolated information about a vehicle’s location in a public
place. 184 But the government also could query that database for
all instances in which it captured the license plate of Jane’s vehicle. Like the GPS device in Jones, that query could reveal
many of the private details of Jane’s everyday life by identifying the places that Jane frequents. Just as the Jones surveillance arguably violates a reasonable expectation of privacy, so
too might the query of the license-plate-reader data. Such queries do not clearly fall on one side of the reasonableexpectation-of-privacy line or the other. Eventually, however,
appeals courts will reach a consensus on these specific issues,
or the Supreme Court will announce a rule. There is no reason
this form of rulemaking, so central to our common law system,
cannot be applied to database queries in the same way it is applied to novel questions about information collection.
Another potential objection to this approach is, how will an
analyst know, prior to running a query, what information it
will return? Since the Fourth Amendment status rests on the
nature of the information that the query reveals, rather than
the nature of the query itself, it might seem to demand that
analysts have a crystal ball enabling them to anticipate whether any particular query will qualify as a search. While this is
not an insignificant concern, it can be addressed in a couple of
ways. First, there will be times when an analyst running a query will know for sure that the query should be treated as a
search. Any query of a database that includes Americans’ communications content will, necessarily, implicate a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Second, there will be times when an an182. See supra notes 124–37 and accompanying text (discussing the Jones
majority and concurrences).
183. See supra note 40 (defining CSLI and citing cases).
184. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (discussing Knotts).
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alyst will not know for certain that her query will return
Fourth Amendment protected knowledge, but will have a
sense—based on the nature of the data being queried as well as
the reason for running the query—whether the resulting
knowledge will categorize the query as a search. A query of a
database with comprehensive historical location data, for example, can be expected to reveal intimate details of the query
subject’s life akin to those revealed by GPS surveillance in
Jones. 185 Over time, as the nature of information that certain
sets of databases return, it might become much clearer ex ante
when a reasonable expectation of privacy is at stake. Finally, it
may be that this uncertainty can be captured in the substantive
rules that apply to queries that qualify as searches. For example, perhaps such queries qualify as an exception to the warrant requirement, and so the analyst’s decision to query must
simply be reasonable.186 Under such a regime, any query that
unexpectedly returns information protected by a reasonable
expectation of privacy might be considered reasonable nonetheless. Just as the existing application of the reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test presents difficult and often hard-topredict line-drawing exercises on the part of law enforcement
and the courts, so too will determining when queries must be
treated as searches (and what limits should be placed on such
searches). But just as this has not prevented Fourth Amendment doctrine regarding collection to develop, the same could
prove true in the context of information use, such as queries.
To be sure, this rule represents a significant change in conceptualizing the protective scope of the Fourth Amendment.
And yet it is no more significant a change than Katz itself represented. Prior to Katz, Olmstead v. United States governed
what qualified as a search. 187 Under the Olmstead regime, the
government did not engage in a search unless it physically intruded into a “constitutionally protected area.” 188 Thus in
Olmstead, installing a tap on telephone wires “did not amount
to a search . . . within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,”
because the wires themselves were not located in a constitu-

185. See generally supra note 98 (discussing the results of the GPS surveillance in Jones).
186. See supra note 98 (defining reasonableness as an exception to the warrant requirement).
187. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
188. E.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967).
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tionally protected area, like Olmstead’s home or office. 189 Over
time, however, the Court “departed from the narrow view on
which [Olmstead] rested,” and, finally, in Katz explicitly rejected the “constitutionally protected area” formulation in favor of
inquiring into “what [an individual] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public.”190 And so was
born the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test. 191
In rejecting the Olmstead approach, the Katz majority noted that, “[t]o read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore
the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.” 192 Similarly, to refuse to acknowledge the
expectation of privacy Americans have in the results of some
queries is to ignore the technological changes in how information is stored, transferred, collected, and analyzed. If, as
Katz declared, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places,” 193 it should protect them against violations of their
reasonable expectations of privacy regardless of the means by
which that violation is accomplished. Justice Harlan declared
in his Katz concurrence that “reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion.” 194 If a wiretap that reveals “what [an individual] seeks to
preserve as private” is a search, then a query that exposes that
same information represents just as significant an intrusion. 195
Regulating queries as searches also makes more sense
than trying to address this issue by reforming collection rules.
To be sure, one can argue that Fourth Amendment harm occurs
the moment the government collects information about an individual. When it comes to the type of collection at issue here, we
tend to retain our anonymity at the point of collection. Information about our spending or travel habits, or even the content
of our Google chats, may be sitting on the government’s servers,
but nobody is looking at them. To the extent the goal is barring
arbitrary government action to protect each individual from
unreasonable intrusion into his or her zone of privacy, the moment government action becomes problematic is when it singles

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

277 U.S. at 466.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967).
Id.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 362 (Harlan, J. concurring).
Id.
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out an individual for scrutiny. 196 Once the government has a
particular individual in its sights, it can extract details from
the vast ocean of data about that person. And it is at that moment—when the government generates a detailed profile about
you from a sea of aggregated data—that Fourth Amendment
rules barring arbitrary intrusive action should apply. If we
worry about the government extracting information about specific individuals, then the concern manifests itself at the moment of extraction. Addressing the concern at its source also allows us to protect individual rights while continuing valuable
collection programs.
There are also technological barriers to relying on collection rules to do all the work. As the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology pointed out, data sometimes
contains “latent information about individuals,” which is revealed only if exposed to certain forms of analysis. 197 One cannot regulate the collection of data one cannot see. Moreover, the
aggregation of multiple data points from one form of collection
(such as location data) can itself pose problems. Only limiting
or eliminating government collection of all location information
would address this issue through collection regulation. Finally,
it is often impossible to know whether any given data point will
reveal intimate knowledge when combined with other data either already in the government’s possession or collected subsequently. 198
A final objection might be that queries hold too much value
as an investigative tool to subject to Fourth Amendment limits.
Just because some queries constitute searches, however, does
not mean government investigators cannot perform them. As
the courts often remind us, “the ‘touchstone’ of the Fourth

196. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 10, at 489–90 (recognizing
that harms from information use are distinct from those caused by collection).
Not only is the collection of large datasets less troubling from an individual
rights perspective, it can also be quite valuable. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES
2–3 (2004) (finding that the government uses data mining to improve service
or performance, detect fraud, waste, and abuse; analyze scientific and research
information; detect criminal activity, analyze intelligence and detect terrorist
activities).
197. PCAST, supra note 54, at 39; see also id. at x–xi (“[A] policy focus on
limiting data collection will not be a broadly applicable or scalable strategy—
nor one likely to achieve the right balance between beneficial results and unintended negative consequences (such as inhibiting economic growth).”).
198. See id. at 47–48.
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Amendment is reasonableness.” 199 Just because a query qualifies as a search does not mean the government must secure a
warrant based on probable cause. Perhaps it makes sense to include queries in the list of warrant requirement exceptions,
such that an analyst running a query must have probable cause
to do so but need not secure ex ante judicial sign-off. Or perhaps the courts will consider queries to be more like Terry
stops, 200 requiring only reasonable suspicion. Courts in this
context must be asked to balance the government’s interest in
law enforcement against society’s interests in individual rights,
just as they do in so many other places.
B. OPERATIONALIZING QUERY-SEARCHES
Having determined that some database queries are searches—referred to hereafter as query-searches 201—how can we ensure that the government carries them out in a manner consistent with the Fourth Amendment? To answer this question,
this Section first demonstrates that expanding Fourth Amendment protections to some information use is not as radical a
departure from existing doctrine as it first might appear. It
then details how the FISC has already provided a roadmap for
how Fourth Amendment limitations can be imposed on database query-searches.
1. The Foundation for Constitutionally Based Use Restrictions

While the Constitution is silent on the government’s use of
information in the lion’s share of circumstances,202 the Fourth
Amendment does, in fact, require more than the traditional
constitutional protections governing searches and seizures in a
handful of situations. Both Congress and the courts consider
some information collection methods so intrusive that postcollection constraints on information use are necessary. 203 So, in
some ways recognizing queries as potential searches merely
expands existing doctrine rather than contradicting it.
199. E.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).
200. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
201. To make plain, when I am referring to queries that should be considered Fourth Amendment searches, I refer to them as query-searches.
202. See supra Part II.B.
203. See generally S. REP. NO. 95-701 (1978) (discussing the constraints on
information use for collection methods); see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41 (1967) (stating that wiretapping must have limitations in order to adhere to
the Fourth Amendment).
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Nearly fifty years ago, concerns regarding the intrusive nature of wiretapping prompted the Supreme Court to augment
the Fourth Amendment’s typical warrant requirements (probable cause, particularity, and review by a neutral magistrate)
with procedural rules about how the government handled the
information it collected using that tool. 204 The Supreme Court’s
ruling made it plain to Congress that, to satisfy constitutional
demands, any use of wiretapping must include information
handling limits. 205 Thus when enacting legislative authorization for wiretapping, Congress included such limits, known collectively as minimization procedures. 206 Minimization procedures regulate the government’s handling of information so as
to mitigate the risks that electronic surveillance poses for
Americans’ individual privacy rights.207 The statutes authorizing wiretapping for both domestic law enforcement and foreign
intelligence purposes require minimization. 208 While criminal
investigations implement minimization requirements at the
moment of collection, 209 FISA requires minimization in the retention and dissemination of information as well in order to ensure “information concerning American citizens and lawful resident aliens be handled in such a way as to assure that it is
used only for the purposes specified.” 210 The constitutional need
to minimize information has, over time, expanded beyond the
wiretapping context and currently applies to collection of tan204. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 13 (1978)) (“FISA reflects both Congress’s ‘legislative judgment’ that the court orders and other procedural safeguards laid out
in [FISA] ‘are necessary to insure that electronic surveillance . . . conforms to
the fundamental principles of the fourth amendment [sic].’”); Berman, supra
note 33, at 791–817 (discussing constitutional origins of minimization procedures); Donohue, supra note 72, at 220 (“FISA was Congress’s express decision
to curb executive power as a constitutional matter.”).
207. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2012) (defining minimization procedures);
PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT, supra note 71, at 50 (asserting that minimization procedures impose a “set of controls on data” to “balance privacy and national security interests”).
208. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (every wiretap order “shall contain a provision
that the authorization to intercept shall be . . . conducted in such a way as to
minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception”); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804, 1805 (requiring government surveillance applications and FISC authorization orders to include minimization procedures).
209. S. REP. NO. 95-701, at 41 (1978) (stating that criminal procedures are
an exception to the minimization rule).
210. S. REP. NO. 95-604, at 38 (1977).
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gible things, physical searches, and collection of communications metadata.211
The requirement to minimize is imposed statutorily; the
task of determining exactly what minimization should look like
in any particular circumstance, however, is left to the courts. 212
Minimization procedures thus represent a mandate to courts to
include limits on what the government may do with information gleaned from at least some forms of collection.
At times, courts have also imposed limits on the government’s use of lawfully collected information even in the absence
of a legislative requirement. 213 Recently, for example, the FISC
considered whether the FBI’s queries using U.S.-person selectors should be treated as searches subject to Fourth Amendment regulation. 214 While the court ultimately rejected the idea
that such queries were themselves searches, it did not find
them irrelevant to the constitutional analysis.215 Instead, the
use to which the government plans to put information collected
under Section 702, the FISC concluded, should form part of the
assessment of the reasonableness of the Section 702 program as
a whole. 216 So while the FISC did not impose Fourth Amendment constraints directly on queries as such, it recognized the
constitutional concerns that can arise out of some uses of information. 217
Postcollection use has also become an issue for computer
searches. Because it is often not feasible to identify and isolate
computer files responsive to a warrant at the time of seizure, it
is common practice to make identical copies (or mirrors) of
211. See 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(D) (collection of tangible things); Id.
§ 1881(a) (collection of electronic communications by targeting non-U.S. persons overseas); Id. § 1823(a) (physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes). Collection using a pen register or trap-and-trace device, which provides
information about incoming or outgoing communications, now must employ
“privacy procedures,” which are simply minimization procedures by another
name. Id. § 1842(h). See Berman, supra note 33, at 790–817. (providing a history of the evolution and development of minimization procedures).
212. Surveillance laws have consistently assigned the job of determining
what minimization procedures are appropriate to the courts. 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1805(a)(3), 1861a(1).
213. [Redacted] Memorandum and Opinion & Order at 41 (FISA Ct., Nov.
6, 2015); id. at 40 (rejecting the argument that “each query of Section 702–
acquired information [using U.S.-person identifiers] is a ‘separate action subject to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test’”).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 42.
216. Id. at 40–41.
217. Id. at 41–45.
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computer hard drives to review their contents off-site. 218 In so
doing, however, the government necessarily seizes a great deal
of nonresponsive material—everything on the computer drive
unrelated to criminal activity, such as family photos, contact
lists, emails, and the like. Courts have recently grappled with
how to limit the government’s access to or use of that nonresponsive information. In United States v. Ganias, for example,
the court considered whether investigators can obtain a warrant to search a set of files the government happens to have in
its possession because they were seized pursuant to a previous
warrant, to which those files were not responsive. 219 A threejudge panel of the Second Circuit held that despite the valid initial collection of the information, the government violated the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by retaining the nonresponsive information in the absence of “some independent basis” for doing so.220 Permitting the government to “retain all the
data on [an individual’s] computers on the off chance the information would become relevant to a subsequent criminal investigation,” the court said, would “be the equivalent of a general warrant.” 221 And in his concurring opinion in In re
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Judge Alex Kozinski articulated
a list of suggested guidelines for investigators to follow when
executing searches that are likely to expose investigators to
nonresponsive information. 222
218. This two-step process of first seizing or copying digital storage devices
and then searching its contents later is routine. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(B).
219. 755 F.3d 125, 138 (2d Cir. 2014), vacated on other grounds, 824 F.3d
199 (2d Cir. 2016).
220. 755 F.3d at 138. The Second Circuit subsequently agreed to hear the
case en banc, vacated the panel decision, and resolved the case on other
grounds, declining to rule on the validity of the data retention or the second
warrant. The en banc court did recognize, however, the highly intrusive nature of the government’s actions, observing that “the seizure of a computer
hard drive, and its subsequent retention by the government, can give the government possession of a vast trove of personal information about the person to
whom the drive belongs, much of which may be entirely irrelevant to the criminal investigation that led to the seizure.” Id.
221. Id. at 137; accord United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir.
2007) (recognizing that “there may be a persuasive argument . . . that an individual retains an expectation of privacy in the future uses of her DNA profile”).
222. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621. F.3d 1162,
1178–80 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring). Some magistrate
judges have also begun imposing limits on how the government executes
searches of digital storage devices. See Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of
Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV. 1241, 1246 (2010) (noting this
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These isolated instances, while representing a tentative extension of Fourth Amendment rules into the use space in certain contexts, do not go far enough. Each of these examples
represents what I call a collection-plus regime. Either Congress
or the courts determine that collection rules alone are insufficient, so they augment those rules with use restrictions. Numerous commentators have also advocated some form of collection-plus regime, where postcollection use of information is
considered relevant to the constitutionality of the original
search or seizure. 223 A collection-plus regime does not independently require use constraints, but instead applies them
cumulatively, adding their procedural protections to those of
the collection rules. The question is thus whether the whole of
the government’s action, from collection to use, complies with
Fourth Amendment demands.
These collection-plus approaches take a step in the right
direction by recognizing that the government’s postcollection
use, at least in certain circumstances, is constitutionally relevant. I contend, however, that collection-plus regimes do not go
far enough. The most critical shortcoming of collection-plus is
practice and arguing that it is both unwise and beyond the scope of the magistrates’ power).
223. See, e.g., Deven R. Desai, Constitutional Limits on Surveillance: Associational Freedom in the Age of Data Hoarding, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579,
625 (2014) (arguing for time limits on the use of data); Stephen E. Henderson,
Our Records Panopticon and the American Bar Association Standards for
Criminal Justice, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 699, 720 (2014) (advocating further development of use restrictions); Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence: The Case for Use Restrictions on Nonresponsive Data, 48 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1, 25 (2015) (“Although the seizure of nonresponsive files is reasonable
when needed to effectuate the search for responsive files, subsequent use of
the seized nonresponsive files transforms the nature of the seizure and renders it constitutionally unreasonable.”); Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data
Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 51
(1995) (arguing that “the reasonableness of a seizure extends to the uses that
law enforcement authorities make of property and information”); Robert S.
Litt, The Fourth Amendment in the Information Age, 126 YALE L.J.F. 8, 15–16
(2016) (arguing that courts assessing the constitutionality of government action should take into account “not only the nature of the data the government
is collecting, but the use the government is going to make of that data”); Peter
Swire, A Reasonableness Approach to Searches After the Jones GPS Tracking
Case, STAN L. REV. ONLINE, Feb. 2012, https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/
online/privacy-paradox-a-reasonableness-approach-to-searches-after-the-jones
-gps-tracking-case (arguing that factors such as the length and intrusiveness
of surveillance as well as the use of minimization procedures, if any, should
factor into the question whether the government search was reasonable); cf.
Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 388 (2015)
(noting that acquisition and use restrictions “must go hand-in-hand”).
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that when it comes to Fourth Amendment–exempt information—such as third-party records—there is no constitutional
analysis into which one could incorporate limits on the government’s postcollection use.224 For all the vast spectrum of information, ranging from the innocuous to the intensely private,
that is exempt from Fourth Amendment coverage, courts have
no opportunity to consider whether the use of that information
renders its collection unreasonable, because the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement does not apply in
the first place.225 Moreover, it is not clear at the time of collection whether or when the aggregation problem will arise with
respect to particular data. The insight that aggregation permits
may result only from the combination of data sets that are
fused after—perhaps years after—the collection has taken
place. 226 The idea of assessing the government’s action as a
whole in those circumstances is unwieldy at best. If you accept
the argument that queries of aggregated information reveal
more than the individual bits of information the government
collects, we must recognize those uses themselves as searches
entitled to their own independent Fourth Amendment analysis,
regardless of how the underlying information was collected.
2. Implementing Query-Search Limits
If one accepts the argument that courts should assess query-searches independently of the means by which the information was collected, the question becomes how they might do
so. Here, I argue that the FISC has already shown us what
such an analysis might look like. Indeed, the minimization procedures that FISC judges demanded in their orders approving
224. Donohue, supra note 72, at 243 (describing Professor Kerr ’s argument
that “because third-party record collection constitutes neither a search nor a
seizure, the doctrine would have to be radically overhauled to make all collection of data a seizure to then trigger a reasonableness analysis”).
225. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding that it is neither
a search nor a seizure to monitor the location of a beeper placed in chemicals
being transported to owner ’s cabin); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)
(holding that a telephone company’s use of a pen register is not a search); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (holding that testimony from conversations between government informant and defendant did not violate the
search and seizure limits of the Fourth Amendment). But see United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (holding it is a search to monitor a beeper that is
inside a house and therefore withdrawn from public view).
226. See PCAST, supra note 54 at ix; id. at xii (noting that collection rules
cannot guard against future, unknown privacy threats, so use is “the technically most feasible place to protect privacy”).
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the Section 215 bulk metadata collection program look more
like the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement procedures
than anything else. 227 The Section 215 program itself was not
subject to Fourth Amendment limits because the government
argued, and the FISC agreed, that the metadata collection fell
within the scope of the third-party doctrine. 228 The statutes required minimization procedures, but given the absence of
Fourth Amendment demands, such procedures could have been
nominal. As I have argued elsewhere, in imposing robust limits
on query-searches of the Section 215 database nonetheless, the
FISC signaled recognition of those query-searches’ Fourth
Amendment–based implications and demonstrated how other,
similarly intrusive query-searches might be subject to Fourth
Amendment oversight.229
Before demonstrating this point, a quick primer on the
purposes of each of the warrant requirement’s three elements is
in order. First, there is ex ante review by a neutral magistrate,
based on the idea that officials with “investigative and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means . . . . The historical judgment,
which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain”
information and “overlook potential invasions of privacy and
protected speech.” 230 Second, the cause requirement limits arbitrary government action. 231 In forcing the government to
demonstrate that there is an answer to the question why are
you searching this person or seizing this information?, cause
requirements guarantee that the search or seizure will be
based on objective evidence, rather than the exercise of unfet227. See infra notes 234–39 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of the Section 215 use regime and its constitutional shadings, see Berman, supra note 33, at 806–17.
228. See In re [REDACTED], No. PT/TT [REDACTED] (FISA Ct., July 14,
2004). The limits on the collection of that data were statutory: the information
had to be both “relevant” to an authorized terrorism or intelligence investigation and subject to minimization procedures. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b) (2015).
229. See Berman, supra note 33, at 817–24.
230. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972).
231. See Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable”: The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 317 (2016)
(“[T]he sine qua non of official arbitrariness is allowing officers unfettered ‘discretion’ to search whenever the whim strikes.”). Individualized suspicion requirements reduce the likelihood of government intrusion on the basis of (implicit or explicit) bias, individual animus, or other improper motives. Id. at
317–20.
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tered executive discretion. 232 Third, the particularity requirement prevents the government from “rummag[ing] through
homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity.” 233 So just as the government must explain why it has singled out a particular individual, it must also explain exactly
what it expects the search to yield. Together, these requirements ensure that a government determination to intrude into
an individual’s private realm is both objectively justified and
limited in scope.
The FISC imposed approximations for each of these elements in its oversight of the Section 215 program. First, it required all queries to be approved through ex ante review by a
high-ranking government official. If the query-search involved
“seed accounts . . . used by U.S. persons,” approval had to come
from the NSA’s Office of General Counsel (NSA OGC). 234 So
while individual determinations regarding whose metadata
would be accessed did not require judicial preapproval, the
NSA OGC’s approval did serve to diminish discretion by ensuring that officers with “investigative and prosecutorial duty”
were not “the sole judges” of when to execute queries about U.S.
persons. 235 While someone in the NSA’s OGC is not an independent magistrate, she is more able to make an impartial assessment than an agent or official actually involved in an investigation.
Second, the FISC imposed a cause standard on Section 215
query-searches, in the form of the “reasonable articulable sus-

232. When the courts have not insisted on individualized suspicion, they
have usually insisted on some other means of limiting the discretion of the officers in the field. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654–55 (1979) (holding that when the circumstances preclude “insistence upon ‘some quantum of
individualized suspicion,’ other safeguards are generally relied upon to assure
that the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not ‘subject to the
discretion of the official in the field’” (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S.
523, 532 (1967))); Friedman & Stein, supra note 231, at 310 (quoting Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52–53 (1979)). But see Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 278–79 (2011) (arguing that the special needs doctrine permits suspicionless searches with no limits on discretion).
233. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (citations omitted)
(pointing out that “the Fourth Amendment was the founding generation’s response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ . . . of the colonial era,” which permitted indiscriminate searches).
234. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 06-08, 6 (FISA Ct., Aug. 18, 2006).
235. Id.
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picion” requirement.236 This standard required a determination
that, “based on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there
are facts giving rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS)
that [the particular seed] to be queried is associated with [REDACTED—probably ‘an international terrorist organization’ or
‘Al Qaeda’].” 237 The FISC actually saw the reasonable articulable suspicion standard as analogous to a cause requirement,
asserting that imposing this limit on query-searches would ensure “that ‘[t]he information actually viewed by any human being . . . will be just as limited—and will be based on the same
targeted, individual standards’” as searches governed by the
Fourth Amendment.238
Finally, the reasonable articulable suspicion standard
steps in for the particularity requirement as well. That collection of everyone’s telephone metadata will net a huge amount
of irrelevant information is a certainty. 239 Because querysearches could be directed only at those seed identifiers for
which the government had reasonable articulable suspicion of
connection to a terrorist organization, however, the government
is limited to inquiries that will yield information related to the
communications of suspected terrorists and their associates.
Government officials could not query the database in search of
nonterrorism-related crimes or threats.
These minimization requirements are not identical to the
ones that would apply to the collection of information whose
seizure required a warrant. But they do create proxies for each
of those traditional protections. The FISC thus employed minimization rules to impose limitations that clearly took Fourth
Amendment concerns into account.
3. Implications for Surveillance Programs and Beyond
Query-searches could be subjected to a regime similar to
the one the FISC imposed on the Section 215 program. 240 This
236. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-80, 3 (FISA Ct., Apr. 25, 2013).
237. Id. No U.S.-person seed could meet the RAS standard solely on the
basis of activities protected by the First Amendment. Id.
238. In re [REDACTED], No. PR/TT [REDACTED], 58 n.41 (FISA Ct., July
14, 2004) (internal quotations and emphasis omitted).
239. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109, 18 (FISA Ct., Aug. 29, 2013).
240. This Article does not advocate interpreting the Fourth Amendment to
require for all query-searches the exact same rules that the FISC imposed in
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is perhaps most compelling in the context of querying Americans’ Section 702–acquired communications, which includes the
contents of U.S. persons’ communications with overseas targets. The government takes advantage of the absence of constitutional limits to query-search Section 702–acquired information using selectors associated with U.S. persons, thereby
gaining access to the contents of Americans’ communications
with no individualized suspicion, no particularity requirement,
and no ex ante review. Hence the “backdoor loophole” moniker
by which such query-searches are known.
Unfortunately, the FISC rejected the argument that these
queries should be treated as searches, instead holding that they
should be subject to a collection-plus regime. 241 According to
the FISC opinion, the queries are not themselves searches, but
their use must be factored in to the constitutionality of the Section 702 program as a whole.242 But the constitutionality of the
government’s access to U.S. persons’ communications content
should not be dependent on how other aspects of the Section
702 program operate. Access to Americans’ communications
content is at the heart of traditional Fourth Amendment protection. The same rules should apply whether the government
accesses that information from a database sitting on its own
servers, secures a warrant to acquire that information from a
communications provider’s server, or executes a warrant to
seize an individual’s personal computer. Section 702 querysearches should be considered reasonable only when the government can demonstrate to an executive branch official, or
(even better) to the FISC itself, individualized suspicion about
the target of the query-search.243 Moreover, a particularity requirement should limit the government to query-searches that
are designed to return information relevant to the purpose of
the program—foreign intelligence information. This would allow the government to both continue employing Section 702 for
its original purpose—the collection of foreign intelligence—and
prevent the use of U.S.-person identifiers to access communicathe Section 215 program. Once queries are recognized as searches, reasonable
minds can disagree regarding what those rules should be; I defer to another
day the difficult task of answering that question.
241. See supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text.
242. Id.
243. The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 requires the government to seek
FISC approval for any queries of telephone metadata. USA FREEDOM Act of
2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 101, 129 Stat. 268 (2015) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1861 (2012)).
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tions to which it would not have lawful access in the absence of
Section 702.
Query-searches are not limited to the foreign intelligence
context. Government officials of all types utilize databases to
seek out information about U.S. persons. In fact, before even
opening an official investigation, FBI agents are authorized to
examine not only all FBI and Department of Justice records,
but also “records maintained by . . . other federal, state, local,
or tribal, or foreign governmental entities or agencies.” 244 Such
inquiries require an “authorized purpose,” but no individualized suspicion. 245 This authority may be used to obtain information “on individuals, groups, or organizations of possible investigative interest,” either because they may be involved in
crime or threats to the national security “or because they may
be targeted for attack or victimization.” 246 Thus federal agents
have a green light to query any and all databases available to
them about U.S. persons even in the absence of individualized
suspicion.
Queries of government databases by federal, state, local, or
tribal law enforcement entities can prove just as intrusive as
those used in the Section 215 or Section 702 programs. The
NYPD’s DAS, for example, can track where a particular car is
located and where it has been the past days, weeks, or months
and it can aggregate that information with license plate information, as well as watch lists and criminal history. 247 In other
words, it allows the police to identify connections between persons, places, and things in ways that a human crime analyst
may not have been able to do. 248 Cross-referencing the federal
government’s biometric databases with surveillance camera
footage or photos on social media websites could provide an
hour-by-hour account of a particular individual’s location and
activities.249 Imagine a query compiling financial records with
information about products with RFIDs. Such a query would
244. FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS, THE
FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS 20 (2008).

ATTORNEY GEN.’S GUIDELINES

245. Authorized purposes are “to detect, obtain information about, or prevent or protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security or to
collect foreign intelligence.” Id. at 19.
246. Id. at 17.
247. See Joh, supra note 11, at 48–49.
248. Id.
249. See Jennifer Lynch, FBI’s Facial Recognition Is Coming to a State
Near You, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 2, 2012), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2012/07/fbis_facial_recognition_coming_state_near_you.
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indicate what one purchases and where (or to whom) it goes.
Similarly, combining employment records with travel records
could expose the fact that your last sick day was actually a
three-day weekend at the beach.
Sometimes database queries will be highly effective tools
used to locate criminals, and this Article does not argue that
the government should be barred from using them wholesale.
Instead, the argument is merely that when the government uses a U.S.-person identifier to search aggregated information,
that query should often qualify as a search and the Constitution should impose limits on those queries, just as it does a
search of your home or a stop-and-frisk on the street.
C. THE INDISPENSABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION
The foregoing discussion has largely focused on what the
Constitution requires or permits. But, of course, the Constitution is not the only means of regulating government conduct.
Many of the government’s collection techniques (as well as
some uses) are subject to statutory, regulatory, or policy-based
limits. Here, I explain why these existing nonconstitutional
rules do not sufficiently address the concerns raised by querysearches, and will not likely do so in the future.
Those who are content to rely on legislative or regulatory
action to impose limits on the government’s use of new technologies argue that policy makers are better suited than courts to
determine appropriate constraints.250 Congress’s past performance in regulating to protect privacy, however, does not support this approach. Legislative measures addressing perceived
shortcomings in data privacy are almost universally perceived
as outdated, incomplete, insufficiently rigorous, or some combination of the three. 251 The United States lacks an overarching,
250. E.g., Kerr, supra note 121, at 857–81 (arguing that courts do not respond to new technological challenges swiftly enough and that we should rely
on the legislature to do so instead); Peter Margulies, Searching for Judicial
Power: Article III and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (Roger Williams Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 171, 2016), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2827767 (arguing that Congress should be
given deference in making decisions related to national security and evolving
technology). But see, e.g., Swire, supra note 81, at 915–19 (expressing skepticism regarding Congress’s ability to protect privacy effectively).
251. See, e.g., Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 36, at 1154 (“Our
information regulatory infrastructure is disconnected, often outdated, and inadequate to meet the challenges of the new technologies of the Information
Age.”). ECPA requires a warrant for collecting the contents of your e-mail, but
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unified information protection regime. Instead, when Congress
has acted at all, it has done so piecemeal, through a series of
narrowly targeted statutes. 252
The USA Freedom Act of 2015 might initially paint a
promising picture. 253 After all, the FISC did impose Fourth
Amendment–like minimization procedures on the Section 215
program, 254 the reauthorization debate as the statute approached its sunset date was intense, and Congress ended up
codifying, in large part, the FISC’s judicially imposed limits on
Section 215’s scope.255 Indeed, one provision in the legislation
not for collecting other data stored in the cloud. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 90,
at 1213–18.
252. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1430–45 (2001)
[hereinafter Solove, Privacy and Power] (discussing the “limits of privacy law”
and identifying flaws in multiple privacy statutes, including those protecting
information about credit records, health, and education, as well as information
included on drivers’ licenses and in electronic communications); Taipale, supra
note 58, at 53–55 n.223 (comparing the piecemeal U.S. information privacy
regime with Europe’s more comprehensive approach); Solove, Privacy and
Power, supra, at 1440 (“Since the 1970s, Congress has grappled with the problem of databases, but has been slow to take action.”). Moreover, when statutory protections do apply, those “protections” are much less rigorous than typical
Fourth Amendment rules, often dispensing with ex ante review or individualized suspicion. Solove, Privacy and Power, supra, at 1430–45. Statutory limits
often set a low threshold for the government to meet. E.g., Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012) (information must be “relevant and material to an ongoing . . . investigation”); Id. § 2703(d) (requiring “specific and articulable facts” (but not probable cause) giving reasonable grounds to believe
the information will be relevant and material to an ongoing investigation).
Most information in the hands of third parties may be acquired simply by issuing a subpoena, some of which may be issued by prosecutors or law enforcement officials with no prior judicial approval. E.g., id. § 3486 (administrative
subpoenas); id. § 2709 (national security letters, which permit the FBI to get
customer ’s telephone toll and transactional records); see also 12 U.S.C. § 3414;
15 U.S.C. § 1681u (banking, financial, and credit information).
253. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861) (barring bulk collection of telephone and Internet
metadata). As I have argued elsewhere, the USA FREEDOM Act was a shift
in the right direction, but it did not do nearly enough. See Emily Berman, The
Two Faces of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 91 IND. L.J. 1191
(2016).
254. See supra notes 234–39 and accompanying text.
255. In modifying the Section 215 authorities in the USA FREEDOM Act of
2015, Congress retained many of the limits initially imposed as minimization
procedures by the FISC. The legislation preserved the individualized cause
requirement by codifying the RAS standard. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(C) (to access calling records the government must show “there is a reasonable, articulable suspicion” that the seed identifier—the “special selection term” (SST) in
the language of the statute—“is associated with” a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power “engaged in international terrorism”). The statute also in-
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was even more restrictive than the one the FISC required, perhaps because some legislators argued the Constitution demanded it. 256 Thus we had a regulatory regime that was adopted, refined in part due to constitutional concerns, and codified
by Congress. Problem solved, right? Wrong.
To the extent the USA Freedom Act is a success story, it is
the exception, not the rule. As an initial matter, the prior version of Section 215 had a sunset date. And while sunsets alone
are not usually sufficient to force policy changes, this sunset
provision followed closely on the heels of Edward Snowden’s
massive leak of information about U.S. surveillance activities. 257 That leak revealed that the government was interpreting Section 215 of FISA in an expansive and highly controversial way. In other words, the revelation of a secret program,
targeted at Americans, and interpreting executive collection
powers in the most aggressive way possible was enough to
prompt Congress to restrict query-searches in that context. By
contrast, Section 702 sunsets on December 31, 2017, yet there
has been no public outcry objecting to the way the government
query-searches the communications of Americans scooped up
that program. Some legislators believe that such querysearches violate the Fourth Amendment, but that view has not
led to change, nor does it seem likely that it will. 258
cluded a particularity requirement. Id. §§ 1861(k)(4)(B), 1861(c)(2)(A) (allowing collection regarding only an SST that “specifically identifies an individual,
account, or personal device” and requiring that the FISC’s order describe “each
specific selection term . . . with sufficient particularity to permit them to be
fairly identified”). The statute’s ex ante review requirement differed from the
FISC’s Section 215 minimization rules in that it requires prior review by the
FISC itself rather than internal executive branch officials. Id. § 1861(a).
256. E.g., 161 CONG. REC. H2916 (daily ed. May 13, 2015) (statement of
Rep. Nadler) (“[T]he dragnet collection without a warrant of telephone records
. . . is the contemporary equivalent of the British writs of assistance . . . that
the Fourth Amendment was drafted to outlaw.”); 161 CONG. REC. H2920 (daily
ed. May 13, 2015) (statement of Rep. Jeffries) (“[E]nding bulk collection
through section 215” was a step toward “restoring the balance” between effective national security and respect for privacy demanded by the Constitution).
257. See Emily Berman, The Paradox of Counterterrorism Sunset Provisions, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777 (2013) (arguing that sunsets fail to prompt
legislative reform unless they coincide with a scandal of some kind).
258. E.g., 161 CONG. REC. E726-04 (2015) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (“Section 702 of FISA has been improperly used to obtain the content of
Americans’ private communications without a warrant, which is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.”); 161 CONG. REC. H2923 (daily ed. May
13, 2015) (statement of Rep. Sanford) (“ The notion that Americans’ rights are
contingent on the geography of where a call is directed is not consistent with
the Constitution and highlights why [Section 702] needs to be changed.”).
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The perfect storm that swept the USA Freedom Act into
existence is not something we can count on happening regularly. The Snowden leaks are likely a once-in-a-generation event.
The only comparable historical event is the leak of the Pentagon Papers half a century ago. The Snowden leaks not only
triggered sufficient outrage regarding Section 215 to motivate
legislative action; they also brought to light the very existence
of the program. If Congress or the American public are not
aware of the way the government is using information, legislative action is impossible. Thus the FBI’s efforts to keep its use
of Stingrays under wraps ensured that the public lacked sufficient information to generate or enable opposition by legislators
or their constituents. Nor do most people know whether and
how their state or local law enforcement agencies employ information gathered from Stingrays, license plate readers, surveillance camera footage, or other modern collection methods.
Congress’s efforts to fill perceived statutory holes in the
privacy regime, when they do come, have sometimes stalled indefinitely. For years, there has been bipartisan consensus, for
example, that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
needs to be updated to reflect current technology. 259 The Email
Privacy Act, a reform bill, passed the House of Representatives
419–0. 260 Yet it still languishes, caught up in debate over when
the government will be able to access information protected by
the law.261
Reliance on regulatory regimes imposed on query-searches
through minimization requirements warrants similar skepticism. First, foreign intelligence collection is effectively the sole
context to which minimization requirements apply. Among all
of the domestic law enforcement tools, only the law regulating
wiretaps requires the government to minimize. And there, minimization applies only to the collection stage, rather than the
retention, use, and dissemination stages that dominate FISA

259. James Stiven, ECPA Reform Will Protect Privacy and Meet Law Enforcement Needs, HILL (June 2, 2016), https://www.thehill.com/blogs/pundits
-blog/technology/281987-ecpa-reform-will-protect-privacy-meet-law
-enforcement-needs (noting that “[f ]ew problems in recent years have drawn
more extensive bipartisan support” than ECPA reform).
260. Email Privacy Act, H.R. 699, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. REP. NO.
114-528 (2015).
261. Marcy Wheeler, Why Is the Government Poison-Pilling ECPA Reform?,
EMPTYWHEEL (June 7, 2016), https://www.emptywheel.net/2016/06/07/why-is
-the-government-poison-pilling-ecpa-reform.
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minimization. 262 Moreover, minimization in the criminal context sometimes seems to be more honored in the breach, thanks
in part to the Supreme Court’s reluctance to suppress evidence
based on failure to minimize. 263 If the Fourth Amendment applied to all query-searches, courts would be required to impose
necessary constraints in all areas of law, not just in wiretaps
and foreign intelligence surveillance.
Second, minimization procedures apply only to information
not available publicly. Depending on how broadly the concept of
public information is construed, this could include a great deal
of the information that the government collects under Fourth
Amendment exemptions or purchases from third parties. Yet,
as U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press recognized, the aggregation of publicly available information can be quite revealing.264
Third, one common means of minimizing data is to strip
out any personally identifying information. 265 As more and
more information becomes available, however, rediscovering
the personally identifiable information, even after it has been
stripped is relatively easy to do. Some attributes are uniquely
identifying on their own, but more importantly any attribute
can be identifying in combination with others. One study
showed that by combining “public, Personal Genome Project
profiles containing zip code, birthdate, and gender with public
262. See Berman, supra note 33, at 790–99.
263. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139–42 (1978) (holding that
the failure of agents executing a wiretap warrant to make a good faith effort to
minimize interception did not require suppression); James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the Federal Wiretap Law
To Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65, 77 (1997) (“ The minimization requirement . . . has not been strictly enforced . . . .”); Peter J. Georgiton,
The FBI’s Carnivore: How Federal Agents May Be Viewing Your Personal Email and Why There Is Nothing You Can Do About It, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1831,
1860 (2001) (“ The [Scott] Court’s determination of what factors constitute
‘reasonableness’ for the purposes of minimization requirements has been applied by lower courts to justify a variety of broad searches.”).
264. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press,
489 U.S. 749, 763–64 (1989).
265. Personally identifiable information is
information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s
identity, such as their name, social security number, biometric records, etc. alone, or when combined with other personal or identifying
information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual, such
as date and place of birth, mother ’s maiden name, etc.
Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, Deputy Dir. for Mgmt., U.S. Office of
Mgmt. & Budget to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies, M-07-16 n.1 (May
22, 2007).
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voter rolls, and mining for names hidden in attached documents, 84–97 percent of the profiles” could be accurately
matched with a name. 266 As technology advances, minimization
practices like anonymization and data deletion that have been
used for privacy protection in the past are not going to work because they are “increasingly easily defeated by the very techniques” that are used in analyzing data. 267
Finally, another crucial difference between constitutional
doctrine and the implementation of statutes and regulations is
their transparency. Another lesson Edward Snowden taught us
is that knowing the language of the statute is not always sufficient to understand exactly how that statute is being implemented. Rules that impact fundamental rights like privacy
should be entirely public. 268 Too often, agency interpretations,
guidelines, targeting and minimization procedures, and other
limits originating in the executive branch have remained secret. This is not the case when it comes to judicial opinions, and
to the extent the rules are developed by the FISC (whose decisions often are classified), any statutory or constitutional interpretation that court engages in also must be made public.
Since neither statutory nor minimization-based constrains
will successfully alleviate concerns regarding the intrusiveness
of query-searches, Constitution-based rules must be developed.
To be sure, such rules will impose costs and burdens on government agencies and officials, potentially reducing investigative efficiency. On the other hand, forcing government officials
to target only those individuals for whom individualized suspicion exists could improve efficiency, eliminating fruitless fishing expeditions. More importantly, however, not all limits on
government activity are designed to maximize efficiency. Rather, some are there to protect individual rights, even if such
protection renders governance incrementally less efficacious.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the nation’s history, changes in the technology
to which the government has access when conducting investigations have prompted adjustments in legal doctrine. Today as
266. PCAST, supra note 54, 39–40.
267. Id. at xi, 38.
268. See generally Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 241 (2015) (arguing against the idea of secret law and in
favor of a presumption that the rules available to the public accurately inform
the polity of what the government is doing).
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never before, technology has steamed ahead at a pace with
which the law has struggled (unsuccessfully) to keep up. Today’s technology provides not only better versions of existing
tools; it also provides entirely new tools, tools that do not fit
neatly into any of our doctrinal paradigms. The government
has gone from building profiles on individuals by seeking out
paper files from disparate sources in various jurisdictions to
aggregating massive amounts of data with the click of a mouse.
This capacity to aggregate information, when combined with
the amount of detailed information about each of our lives that
is digitally captured and preserved, is not just a better mousetrap; it is a global mouse vaporizer. That is to say, it must be
recognized as a new phenomenon, not merely a more effective
version of an existing tool. While the phenomenon is new, the
red flags it raises are as old as government itself. Fortunately,
our founding document speaks not in the language of technology but in the language of rights. And those rights must be preserved even in the face of an information revolution in a digital
age. When queries of aggregated information reveals
knowledge in which U.S. persons have a reasonable expectation
of privacy, the Fourth Amendment right to be secure in our
persons, houses, papers, and effects is triggered just as surely
as if the government had entered our home and physically sorted through our financial, medical, familial, and associational
records. Such queries therefore demand the same label as such
a home invasion: search.

